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Abstract 
Children and elephants: A study of mentalization, empathy, and attitudes towards 
conservation in participants of an elephant-based environmental intervention in 
West Africa. 
 
By 
Erica Rogers 
 
Advisor: Professor Steven B. Tuber, Ph.D. 
Recent research suggests that children’s identification with animals and propensity 
to learn from animal experiences might make animal-focused interventions ideal for 
social and emotional development. A child’s ability to understand their own and 
others’ feeling states has been linked to emotional resilience and has been identified 
as a protective factor against the development of pathology later in life (Allen & 
Fonagy, 2006). This study examined the impact of an ongoing conservation-based 
intervention in Burkina Faso on conservation attitudes, mentalization and 
empathy. Participants were 106 Burkinabe students, 56 male and 50 female, ages 
9-15. Participants were split into four groups, a direct exposure, indirect exposure in 
the field, indirect exposure in the classroom, and a control group. Primary outcome 
measures were modified versions of the Children’s Environmental Attitude and 
Knowledge Scale (CHEAKS; Leeming, O’Dwyer & Bracken, 1995), the Mentalizing 
Stories test for Adolescents (MSA; Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009), and the Basic Empathy 
Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006). Significant between-group differences in 
change scores were found on the modified CHEAKS. The group with direct exposure 
to elephants showed greater positive change scores than all three other groups. No 
significant between-group differences were found on the modified MSA or BES. Pre-
post changes in qualitative data were also examined. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The current study examined the psychological impact of an ongoing 
conservation-based intervention in Burkina Faso, West Africa. I came to this 
research through my work in conservation education with children in the U.S. and 
in West Africa. Work with these children led me to think about what is necessary in 
the development of a conservation ethic, and further, what is beneficial about this 
type of intervention for a child’s development. I noticed that a critical component of 
developing a conservation ethic is the ability to think about others. Since 
conservation is linked to awareness of the other and even caring for others, I 
wondered if these capacities, an ethic of conservation and empathy, developed 
together. If this were the case, then conservation education would have more than a 
positive impact for the environment, but also a positive impact on a child’s healthy 
emotional development.  
In the present study, the intervention being looked at takes local school 
children out to the forest to meet and learn about their elephant neighbors. The 
organization Des Elephants et Des Hommes has been running this program for the 
past ten years. This study aims to examine whether animal interventions and this 
elephant-based intervention in particular, have an effect on the development of 
mentalization and empathy. One of the aims of this research is to investigate 
whether human-animal interactions translate to human relations. 
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Project Rationale 
Recent research suggests that children’s identification with animals and 
propensity to learn from animal experiences might make animal-focused 
interventions ideal for social and emotional development. The present research will 
examine the impact of an animal-focused intervention on two specific 
socioemotional capacities. The first is the development of the capacity to mentalize, 
or understand the thoughts and feelings in one’s own mind and the mind of another. 
The second area is the development of empathy, the capacity to take another’s 
perspective and share in another’s feeling state. Both of these concepts will be 
further elaborated in Chapter 2. 
I am interested in these two areas of affective development because they are 
critical to healthy emotional development. A child’s ability to understand their own 
and others’ feeling states has been linked to emotional resilience and has been 
identified as a protective factor against the development of pathology later in life 
(Allen & Fonagy, 2006). In a study of over 750 children treated at the Anna Freud 
Center in London, Fonagy and Target (1998) found that a lack of the capacity to 
mentalize was the common factor among children with emotional difficulties. 
Similarly, empathy towards others is a major deficit in children with conduct 
disorder. Antisocial individuals are known to lack empathic concern for others. 
Clearly, the development of these emotional capacities in children is an important 
area of study (Sharp, 2006).  
 
3 
 
Research Aims 
The proposed study aims to investigate the affective development, specifically 
development of empathy and mentalization that takes place following this 
conservation-focused intervention that brings children to meet and learn about 
elephants and elephant behavior. This study will evaluate the efficacy of the 
intervention on changing children’s attitude both towards conservation and their 
capacity for empathy towards elephants and humans. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Overview 
 The present study examines the development of empathy and the capacity to 
mentalize seen in children who observe animals, specifically elephants. This 
literature review is presented in three sections, beginning with an overview of 
mentalization and empathy, the two areas of affective development emphasized in 
this study. This section will look at the development of mentalizing and empathic 
capacities and examine possible outcomes of a deficit in either or both of these 
areas. In the next section, research on the relationship between humans and 
animals is reviewed. This section will address the role of animals in children’s 
development, learning, and therapeutic interventions using animals. In the final 
section the reasons for using elephants in an intervention designed to promote 
empathy will be reviewed, and characteristics of and assumptions about elephants 
will be discussed. 
Mentalization and Empathy 
 A review of the terms. 
A child’s ability to understand their own and other peoples’ mental states has 
been linked to emotional resilience and identified as a protective factor against the 
development of pathology later in life (Allen & Fonagy, 2006). This capacity to make 
use of an awareness of their own and other peoples’ thoughts and feelings has been 
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referred to as “mentalization” or “the reflective function” by both cognitive 
developmentalists (Morton & Frith, 1995) and psychoanalysts (Fonagy, 
1991; Fonagy and Target, 1995). Vrouva and Fonagy (2009) explain that 
mentalization is closely related to a family of concepts including “theory of mind, 
reflective functioning, mind reading, social cognition, social understanding, 
emotional intelligence, perspective-taking, and empathy,” (p. 1174).  These 
capacities are part of what define humans as social creatures (de Waal, 2009), and 
are reflective of our need to interact with one another socially. Neurobiological 
findings support the idea that “our brains are hardwired to interact with other 
brains through our ability to mentalize,” (Sharp et al., 2009). Mentalizing can be 
done both consciously and unconsciously (Allen, 2003). 
Mentalization is similar to the concept of “theory of mind,” which was 
developed by primatologists, Premack and Woodruff (1978). Theory of mind refers to 
the capacity to “interpret the behavior of others within the framework of the mind,” 
essentially, understanding the mind of an other. The importance of this basic ability 
in humans was first emphasized in work with autistic patients, as one of the 
primary deficits in autism has been described as an inability to adopt another 
person’s perspective (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Mentalization theory 
integrates developmental research on theory of mind with psychoanalytic concepts 
regarding object relations, self and other. Fonagy and colleagues pioneered much of 
the research on mentalization, expanding on the basic premise of theory of mind 
whereby, in addition to understanding that other people have separate minds one 
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must also be able to imagine an emotional mind, appreciating that mental states 
are distinct and interpretable, and that they exist in a mutual relationship with 
behavior (Fonagy et al., 2002; Slade, 2005). Sharp and colleagues’ (2009) defined 
mentalizing, or theory of mind, “as the set of processes by which children and adults 
understand themselves and others in terms of how they think, feel, perceive, 
imagine, react, attribute, infer, and so on” (p. 314). Researchers have attempted to 
define this concept in various ways, but for the purposes of this paper, Fonagy and 
colleagues’ (2002) definition will be used, where mentalization is an individual’s 
capacity to envision mental states in the self or the other. The term mental state is 
meant to describe all mental experience: thoughts, feelings, desires, beliefs, and 
intentions (Slade, p. 639). 
In the past decade, research has shown that mentalizing helps children to 
regulate their own mental processes, emotions, and behavior, thereby reducing the 
risk of psychopathology (Sharp, in Allen & Fonagy, 2006, p. 112). Slade (2005) 
illustrates how important this capacity is in a person’s ability to engage in 
“productive, intimate, and sustaining relationships, to feel connected to others at a 
subjective level,” but at the same time differentiate one’s self from the other (p. 
271). She explains how seeing the affect as internally generated, rather than a 
concrete external force, facilitates self-regulation. This in turn leads to greater 
autonomy and efficacy in highly charged situations.  Furthermore, the ability to 
understand the mind of the other without feeling overwhelmed or engulfed makes a 
deeper sense of connection possible in interpersonal relationships.  In this way, the 
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mentalizing capacity allows for clearer boundaries between self and other while 
augmenting the capacity for intimate relatedness. Sharp, Fonagy, & Goodyer (2008) 
linked the capacity to mentalize that humans to the ability to engage in activities 
such as family, friendship, love, cooperation, play, and community. Engagement in 
these activities is valued as markers of psychological health. Clearly, this capacity 
serves many functions.  Research reviewing the link between mentalizing deficits 
and psychopathology will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Mentalization and empathy are overlapping, though not entirely 
synonymous, concepts. While the Cambridge English Dictionary nearly defines 
empathy as mentalization, or “the ability to share someone else’s feelings or 
experiences by imagining what it would be like to be in their situation,” (Bates et 
al., 2008), they reflect distinct, but highly correlated constructs. Empathy is an 
affective response more appropriate to someone else’s situation than one’s own and 
suggests the existence of role taking on the part of the empathizer. Role taking 
requires the representation of another’s internal state, thus involving mentalizing 
(Sharp, 2006; citing Blair, 1995). Empathy is then the emotional response to the 
information gathered by mentalizing. Baron-Cohen (2003) divided mentalizing into 
two components: a cognitive component, or theory of mind and an empathizing 
component. This delineation is by no means accepted unanimously in the literature. 
Choi-Kain & Gunderson (2008) posited that in empathy the emphasis is on the 
other while mentalization focuses equally on self and other. Bischof-Köhler (1991) 
defined empathy phenomenologically as “the experience of participating in the 
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emotional state of another and thereby understanding it,” while Decety and Jackson 
(2004) defined empathy functionally as “a complex form of psychological inferences 
in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are combined to yield 
insights into the thoughts and feelings of others.” Garton and Gringart’s (2005), 
who developed a scale to measure empathy in younger children (ages 8 and 9), 
suggested that both an affective and cognitive component are necessary in the 
development of empathy, which encompasses both perspective taking and prosocial 
behavior. In her understanding of what leads to this type of prosocial behavior, 
Gordon (2009) emphasized seeing the other as like us, or identification with the 
other as a key component. In this study we will be looking across species for this 
identification. 
Research confirms that empathy is a critical component of social functioning. 
The development of empathy is crucial for positive socialization (Hoffman, 2000). De 
Waal (2009) goes so far as to say that empathy, in that it contributes to 
peacemaking, is a crucial part of what holds societies together.  
The development of mentalization and empathy. 
“Empathy is an automated response over which we have limited control…Natural 
selection designed our brains so that we’re in tune with our fellow human beings, 
feeling distress at their distress, and pleasure at their pleasure,” (De Waal, 2009, p. 
43).  
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The concept of empathy was first introduced into the psychological literature 
by Lipps (1907) under a German name of EinfuÜhlung (feeling into). He argued 
that EinfuÜhlung cannot be reduced to learning, association, or reasoning, as it 
offers direct access to the “foreign” self.  As De Waal points out, we cannot feel 
anything that happens outside ourselves, but by unconsciously [or consciously] 
merging self and other, the other experience echoes within us (p. 65). Dimberg and 
colleagues (2000) studied the involuntary empathic response seen in humans and 
found that this response to another’s emotion occurs before the stimulus is 
registered consciously. Individuals of many species are distressed by the distress of 
an individual of the same species, and will act to end the other’s distress (Preston & 
DeWaal, 2002).  
As humans, we are born with the capacity for empathy (Gordon, 2009). An 
ability to recognize emotions transcends culture, nationality, race, social class, and 
age (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Zahn-Waxler & Yarrow, 1982). However, 
age and gender differences have been found in the development of this capacity. 
Research has shown that baby girls exhibit an empathic response more frequently 
than baby boys, and two year-old girls exhibit more concern when presented with an 
other in distress than two year old boys (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Martin & Clark, 
1982). There is some debate over when this capacity first develops in children. 
Bischof-Köhler (1991) examined the development of empathy in children ages 16-24 
months. He found that children were able to recognize the distress of another and 
attempt to help in some way. There was some question as to whether this could be 
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considered “emotional contagion,” in which a feeling state of another is experienced 
as one’s own. However, as the children did not attempt to self-soothe, the observed 
behavior was considered distinct from emotional contagion. This study concluded 
that empathy develops in children simultaneously with self-recognition as seen in a 
mirror-recognition task. The results confirmed Hoffman’s (1976) hypothesis that 
empathy, distinct from emotional contagion, develops as early as the second year of 
life.  
It has been theorized that the capacity to mentalize may develop later in 
children, based on studies of the false-belief task, a crucial component of theory of 
mind. Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed the first version of the false-belief task, 
which tests a child’s ability to attribute false belief, or recognize that others can 
have beliefs about the world that are different from their own. A meta-analysis of 
studies of the false belief task in children showed that those younger than three 
more often than not fail the false belief task (Sharp, 2006). Sharp concluded that 
the development of mentalizing abilities seems to be increasingly important around 
the age of four. 
While these theorists present a biological model, there are several different 
models for the development of mentalization and empathy. Some theorists 
emphasize the link between the parents’ attachment status and capacity to 
mentalize in determining whether and how the child develops this capacity (Sharp 
and Fonagy, 2008). Fonagy and Target (2006) maintain that not only does 
mentalization promote better self-regulation, but also the arousal and dysregulation 
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created by activation of the attachment system actually serve to inhibit 
mentalization. The development of mentalization plays a central role in the 
consolidation of the self, a crucial psychic structure in both identity development 
and affect regulation.  Psychoanalysts have emphasized the importance of the 
caregiver’s capacity to reflect on the mental states of the other for the child’s 
development of self (Bion, 1967; Winnnicott, 1956; Kohut, 1977). One aspect of the 
self is the reflective self. The reflective self is how one represents interactions 
between self and other. These include mental experiences, feelings, perceptions and 
beliefs, as well as reflection on these various mental states. The full development of 
the reflective self may be associated with morality, empathy, and resilience, and 
may not fully emerge until late adolescence (Kolberg, 1976; Pellegrini, 1980; Cowen 
et al., 1990). Developing a reflective self is a major goal of psychotherapy (Fonagy et 
al., 1993).  
In optimal development, mentalization is a skill that allows for greater life 
satisfaction and more effective coping in times of stress.  Conversely, individuals 
with deficits in mentalization are vulnerable to a host of emotional and 
interpersonal consequences. Such deficits will be addressed in the following section.  
 Deficits in mentalization and empathy. 
In a study of over 750 children treated at the Anna Freud Center in London, 
Fonagy and Target (1998) found that a lack of the capacity to mentalize was the 
common factor among children with emotional difficulties. The two childhood 
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disorders that are most clearly linked to impairments in mentalizing are autism 
and antisocial behavior disorders (Sharp, 2006, p. 102). This section will examine 
both of these disorders in more detail. 
Autism. 
According to the Autism Society of America, autism is a complex 
developmental disability that typically appears during the first three years of life 
and affects a person’s ability to communicate and interact with others. Autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD) lie on a spectrum that ranges from mild to very severe 
(Grandin, 2011). A core neurological deficit in autism is difficulty relating to other 
people socially (Volkmar, Carter, Grossman, & Klin, 1997). In a severe case an 
individual remains nonverbal and must live in a supervised living situation for the 
rest of his or her life. Research has shown abnormal sensory systems, often 
hypersensitivity, in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (Grandin, 2011, 
p.183). 
Autism researcher Baron-Cohen (1997) coined the term mindblindness to 
describe the social abnormalities observed in children on the autistic spectrum. 
Several observations of autistic children show lack of the development of 
mentalizing behavior. For example, autistic infants appear less interested in people 
(Volkmar et al., 2005), and those with a mental age below three were shown to be 
less likely to attend to an apparently distressed adult (Sigman, Kasari, Kwon & 
Yirmiya, 1992) and to have difficulties imitating facial displays of emotion 
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(Loveland & Tunali, 1994). Mentalizing not only refers to the ability to reflect on 
another’s mind, but also on one’s own mental state. Children with autism seem to 
have difficulties in monitoring their own intensions, desires and thoughts (Phillips 
et al., 1998). Interestingly, diminished attachment behavior observed in autistic 
children often leads parents to seek help for their children (Sharp, 2006).  
A gender difference has been observed in autism, with an 8:1 male-female 
ratio (Wing, 1981). As found in the research on the gender differences in the 
development of empathy, Baron-Cohen (2003) found superior mentalizing skills in 
females as compared to males. These findings led to the development of the extreme 
male brain theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2003). These common gender 
differences may further support the link between mentalization and empathy and 
its importance for healthy social-emotional functioning. 
A major deficit in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is theory of 
mind, or the capacity to mentalize. The fact that individuals on the Autistic 
Spectrum have shown improvements through animal-assisted therapies suggests 
that there is something in the child’s interaction with the animal that helps to 
develop theory-of-mind, or mentalization. It has been suggested that individuals 
with ASD are better able to understand animals. The understanding of theory of 
mind and perceptual processing may be the two key components to understanding 
why animals may be easier for people with ASD to relate to (Papp, 2006). 
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Temple Grandin (2011), who has written extensively about her experience 
with autism, described herself as more easily processing visual rather than verbal 
stimuli. She suggested that like someone on the autistic spectrum, “an animal also 
lives in a sensory world that is not a world of verbal language,” (p. 188). She 
reported that an individual’s ability to understand animals is particularly strong 
because of common sensory-based thinking. Grandin and Johnson (2005) first 
examined the hypothesis that this is the reason that some children and adults with 
ASD relate especially well to animals. They suggested that animals do not think in 
words, and as such memory and experience are filled with detailed sensory 
information. For example, one elephant was known for its fear of diesel engines, but 
not gas, due to a frightening experience associated with the sound of a diesel 
engine. In non-verbal individuals with ASD, similar “fear memories” may occur that 
are linked with sensory stimuli (Grandin, Fine, & Bowers, 2010). Prince-Hughes 
(2004) learned to communicate despite her deficits through relating with gorillas at 
the zoo. Gruen (2009) wrote that Prince-Hughes’ experience is “a poignant lesson of 
self-discovery through recognition in the eyes of another.” She described her 
experience moving from homelessness to working with the gorillas in the zoo where 
she found a sanctuary away from, what was for her, a difficult social world.  
Celani (2002) found that children with ASD appeared to prefer drawings of 
animals to illustrations of humans and interpersonal interactions. Prothmann 
(2009) hypothesized that animals, specifically dogs, might make their behavioral 
intentions more easily understandable to individuals with ASD because, unlike 
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humans, they do not communicate both verbally and non-verbally. Prothmann and 
Fine (2011) suggested that animals are well suited to therapy for ASD for the 
following reasons: (1) Newborn children prefer moving to static visual stimuli; (2) 
Children can identify animals as a separate category visually, before they are able 
to speak; (3) Animals are fascinating to children and offer stronger sensory stimuli 
than inanimate objects; (4) Animal behavior follows certain aims and inspires 
children to learn about animal, and later human, intentions; (5) In the presence of 
animals, children seem to have an intrinsic sense of well-being, safety, and security 
that leads to a learning-conducive atmosphere; and (6) Animals provide multi-
sensory stimuli that does not overtax a child with verbal communication (p. 153). It 
is important to note, however, that animals do not have any expectation of 
reciprocal social exchange and do not communicate in line with human rules of 
social engagement. Therefore learning through animals does not translate directly 
to human communication. However, in related work, Guttmann, Predovic & 
Zemanek (1985) found that children with pets are better at decoding human 
nonverbal emotional cues and are perceived more favorably than their peers. 
Conduct disorder. 
Antisocial behavior seen in children may include a diagnosis of conduct 
disorder. Conduct disorder refers to a group of behavioral and emotional problems 
seen in children and adolescents. Conduct disorder is a disorder with several 
subtypes, for example, relationally versus physically aggressive, and proactive 
versus reactive conduct disorder (Sharp, 2006). Conduct disorder and antisocial 
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behavior have not been as directly linked to deficits in mentalization as in autism, 
but inaccurate mentalizing are markers of this disturbance.  
Research has shown that, unlike in autism, 6-12 year olds diagnosed with 
conduct disorder were able to mentalize, though at times the subject’s mentalizing 
capacity was skewed (Happé and Frith, 1996; Sutton, Reeves, & Keogh, 2000). This 
research found that antisocial children have the cognitive capacity to read the mind 
of another, but they do so inaccurately. However, a particular subgroup of antisocial 
children showed impairment with regard to the empathizing component of 
mentalizing. This subgroup of children with impoverished empathizing was 
identified as those children who might be most at risk for more severe and 
pervasive antisocial behavior (Sharp, 2006, p.110).  Hastings and colleagues (2000) 
hypothesized that a lack of empathy, perhaps located in the amygdala (Blair & 
Frith, 2000), leads to aggression. They explain that this is because in normal 
development, empathy provides immediate feedback that discourages both physical 
and relational aggression because the perpetrator is made aware of (by empathizing 
with) the pain suffered by the victim. This empathic deficit in children exhibiting 
antisocial behavior has been observed in those older than six years. 
In a randomized controlled trial of a mentalization-focused anti-violence 
program, Fonagy and colleagues (2009) found that the school-wide intervention led 
to decreased aggression and improved observed classroom behavior relative to no 
intervention. The ability of this program to reduce children’s experience of 
aggression and victimization supports the claim that aggression, and bullying in 
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particular, may be related to a deficit in empathy and accurate mentalization. The 
Roots of Empathy curriculum is an evidence-based program developed by Mary 
Gordon in 1996 in order to foster empathy and social-emotional literacy in children 
(Gordon, 2005). Gordon implemented this program with the goal of reducing 
aggression, antisocial behavior, and bullying. 
Further intervention. 
Other studies have been examined to look at the impact of empathic concern 
and awareness of the mental states of others. Garton (2004) found that an 
awareness of and sensitivity to others might be beneficial for learning. She 
specifically looked at school learning through collaboration. Mentalization-based 
treatment (MBT) programs have been developed for borderline personality disorder 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004) and autism (Baron-Cohen & the Human Emotions 
Team, 2003). While some school-based and autism focused programs have been 
developed for children focused on the development of mentalization and empathy, 
the majority of interventions have been developed for adults.  
Further study of interventions at an early age is necessary in the 
development of these critical capacities. The proposed study aims to investigate the 
development of empathy and mentalization that takes place following a 
conservation-focused intervention that brings children to meet and learn about 
elephants and elephant behavior. Given this focus, the following section will 
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examine the relationship between humans and animals, children in particular, and 
why this type of intervention might be effective. 
The Human-Animal Relationship 
 People and non-human animals. 
The human relationship to animals cannot be characterized by any one 
perspective or theory. What animals mean to people and the way that animals have 
been involved in human lives has differed over time and across cultures. This 
section will examine our relationships to animals both in actuality and in fantasy, 
as both have influenced our development as humans. 
Arluke and Sanders (1996) claim that the meanings of animals are fixed and 
enduring as social constructions widely accepted throughout a culture and passed 
down through generations. In Western culture, for example, consider the following 
statement, which examines what is considered “wild.”  
At an early age, we learn by watching Disney movies, reading fairy tales, and 
listening to our parents that a “wild animal” can be a tiger in the jungle, an 
elephant in a zoo, a squirrel living in the backyard of a suburban home, an 
ownerless dog that roams the neighborhood, or a mean-spirited, raunchy 
person looking to pick a fight in a bar. (Arluke and Sanders, p. 10) 
What makes these images wild to an American child and how might this perception 
differ cross-culturally? An animal’s context makes a difference in our perceptions 
and relationship to it as well. Compare the difference between human projections 
onto a pet dog and a racing dog. The same animal holds vastly different meaning, 
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one a loving companion and the other machine-like, both based on human social 
constructions. 
Pet keeping is often considered a luxury associated with Western culture, 
affluence and materialism (Serpell, 1996). However, Serpell (2011) cited evidence 
from archeological digs that suggests that the practice of keeping animals as pets 
has been a part of human culture since the domestication of wolf-dogs in the Upper 
Paleaolithic period (11,000-14,000 years ago). This practice has been seen across 
cultures in ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, China, and Japan. 
Although it has been found that people of all cultures have kept pets, it is 
unlikely that pet keeping has attained the prominence that it enjoys in North 
America. As of 2008, there were about 77.5 million pet dogs in America living in 
45.6 million homes; 93.6 million cats in 38.2 million homes; 171.7 million freshwater 
fish in 13.3 million homes; millions of pet ferrets, rabbits, guinea pigs, hamsters, 
rats, mice, gerbils, various birds, and a wide assortment of reptiles and amphibians 
(American Pet Products Association, 2008). A majority, 62 percent, of U.S. 
households owns at least one pet and 45 percent own more than one (Serpell, 2011). 
Even animals such as monkeys, wolves, and large cats are smuggled into homes in 
the U.S. by the thousands (Melson, 2001, p. 31). 
The attraction that humans feel to infants of our own and other species may 
be an innate response. Lorenz (1971) showed that similar facial profiles 
characterize human infants as well as the young of other species, such as dogs, cats, 
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and ducks. Humans are naturally attracted to this set of features and can even feel 
a “surge of disarming tenderness” when looking at the face of a baby animal (Gould, 
1982). However, it is not only tenderness that characterizes our relationship to 
animals. 
Representations of different animals vary widely among individuals. 
Attributes of a particular animal can be meaningful as a reflection of how we see 
ourselves. Sax (1990) suggests that animal symbols project our deepest fears, 
wishes, and conflicts. Humans see animals as mirrors of themselves. Melson (2001) 
puts it poetically: “humans are sketched in animal hues” (p. 145). Looking at 
modern metaphors such as, “chicken out,” “hog the food,” and “taking the lion’s 
share,” we see the ubiquity of animals in our minds. While this holds true for all 
humans, children are perhaps consciously more apt to make use of these 
identifications. As children’s author, Rosemary Wells (1990) states, “animals live in 
a world that children seem to climb right into.” 
 Animals in children’s lives. 
Animals occupy a major role in a child’s imagination. Katcher & Wilkins 
(1998) found that children are able to keep images of animals in their minds for 
long periods of time. Animals dominate children’s dreams, a phenomenon which 
decreases with age (Van de Castle, 1983). Nightmares of children under seven 
frequently contain animals, and 18 percent of children under five reported that 
their biggest fear was of “wild creatures” such as lions, tigers, and wolves (Foster 
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and Aronson, 1936; Ames, 1964). Interestingly, Foster and Aronson found that only 
seven of the 398 studies reported any actual frightening experience with an animal. 
In 1945, Pratt studied children’s reported worst fears. While many of these children 
had fathers who were at war, the overwhelming majority rated scary animals such 
as dogs that bite, bucking horses, scary bears, mean elephants, and biting tigers as 
their biggest fear. It would seem from this study that animals are safe places for 
children to project their fears. A study of Australian fifth-graders found 32 different 
animals fear arousing, the majority of which the children had never encountered 
(Lane & Gullone, 1999). A meta-analysis of childhood fears found that sharks, 
snakes, and spiders consistently top children’s fear lists (Muris, Murkelbach & 
Collaris, 1997). 
Along with aspects of fear and dreaming, animals occupy the imaginations of 
children in a myriad of ways. Most bestselling children’s stories feature animal 
protagonists. Lystad (1980) found that animal characters appeared in more that 75 
percent of a random sample of children’s books published from 1916 to 1950. In a 
random sample of children’s books published from 1988 to 1992, Black found that 
89 percent mentioned animals (Melson, 2001). Similarly, McCrindle and Odendall 
(1994) looked at South African children’s books and found that animals were the 
topic of three out of five stories. The most widely used third-grade texts in the U.S. 
in 1980 were about children’s relationships with animals (Croghan & Croghan, 
1980). Boyd and Mandler (1955) looked at third-grader’s preferences for animals 
and found that 75 percent of children preferred stories with animal characters to 
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identical stories with human characters substituted for the animal characters. 
Among the first 50 words that most American toddlers say are dog, duck, cat, horse, 
bear, and bird, and more children say these words than any other, except mama 
and daddy (Arkow, 2010). Non-human animals dominate the media (Serpell, 1999). 
Children love zoos, aquariums, and natural history museums (Gee, 2011). Zoos, 
aquariums, and nature parks draw more children and their families annually than 
to any sports event in the U.S (Melson, 2001). There are over 100 zoos in the U.S. 
and 35 aquariums, which annually receive about 135 million and 10 million visitors, 
respectively (Kellert, 1997). Saloman (1981) found that in a sample of children in 
grades K-6, 97-98 percent reported desire for a pet, while 53-94 percent across the 
various grade levels already owned a pet. Serpell (2000) estimated that over 70 
percent of children talk to and confide in animals. Melson (2001) argued that many 
cultures, along with American culture, are studying the natural attraction that 
children have to animals.  Besides the cultural popularity of animals in children’s 
lives, they appear in the internal world of children as well. 
Projective tests for children are full of animals. The identification of 
movement on the Rorschach test represents how one is managing internal drives 
and impulses. Rorschach theorists have differentiated between animal movement 
(FM) and human movement (M) on the Rorschach test. Levitt and Truumaa (1972) 
explain that seeing human movement (M) reflects emotional adjustment, and 
specifically, capacity for empathy, self-awareness and the ability to use fantasy as 
a defense mechanism. Rorschach theorists interpret animal movement (FM) 
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responses as more impulsive, less deliberate, and less safely identified with 
than M responses (Ames et al., 1974, p. 59). Schachtel (1950) claimed that animal 
movement responses on the Rorschach represent drives that are unacceptable to the 
self and projected onto the environment. The capacity to produce M responses has 
been positively correlated with age (Levitt & Truumaa, 1972). Few, if any, M 
responses would be expected in the preschool years (Ames et al., 1974). Using 
animals to project inner feelings that are as yet conflictual or unintegrated is 
expected on the Rorschach. In sum, in children a greater number of FM responses 
are expected as desires, feelings, drives, emotions and impulses are not yet fully 
integrated, and therefore projection onto the animal is more likely. Ames and 
colleagues found that children’s responses on the Rorschach Inkblot test 
consistently show animals more frequently than in adults. Animal imagery on the 
Rorschach typically subsides after age ten; though by no means disappear entirely. 
A study of 650 children aged two to ten found that half of all inkblot responses 
involved animals (Ames, Learned, Metraux & Walker, 1952).  
Bellak and Bellak (1961) proposed that using the childhood propensity to see 
animals was the best way to gain insight into a child’s inner conflicts and most 
important relationships. They then developed the Children’s Apperception Test 
(CAT) based on the belief that animals are the preferred identification figures from 
the ages of three to ten. Another projective test, the Animal Preference Test (APT; 
Van Krevelen, 1955) tests children’s identification with animals. In this test a child 
is asked which animal you would most like to be and which animals you would most 
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not like to be, given the caveat that you could not be a human. Baez Rojas and 
Tuber (1991) correlated animal preferences (as measured on the APT) and behavior 
(as measured on the Childhood-Behavior Checklist; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1986) 
in Black and Hispanic 6-12 year-olds. They found rejected animals to be most 
relevant to behavior ratings, where children who rejected nurturing and/or 
beautiful animals correlated with aggressive or depressed symptoms. This suggests 
that children’s representations of animals speaks to their own internal state and 
can even be a way for them to describe their internal experience. 
Freud (1916) was struck by children’s fascination with animals and noted 
how frequently animals appeared in children’s dreams. For him animals 
represented projections of powerful adults, too threatening to the child to appear 
undisguised in dreams. In relating children to animals themselves, he believed that 
children are closest to the instinctual or “animal” drives of the id, which for him 
explained the kinship that children and animals hold. He wrote that,  
The child does not yet show any trace of the pride which afterwards moves 
the adult civilized man to set a sharp dividing line between his own nature 
and that of all other animals. The child unhesitatingly attributes full equality 
to animals; he probably feels himself more closely related to the animal than 
to the undoubtedly mysterious adult, in the freedom with which he 
acknowledges his needs. (Freud, 1916, p.242) 
While animals can stand in for a child’s conflicted or unacceptable feelings, 
they also provide a way of talking about, understanding, and communicating many 
aspects of oneself (Melson, 2001). Part of the work of childhood is developing a sense 
of self (Kohut, 1977). This is done partly though the dreams, stories, fantasies, and 
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play involving animals. Kellert (1997) has extensively studied the relationship 
between people and animals, specifically looking at childhood and adolescence. He 
proposes a relationship between contact with animals and development of the self. 
As Melson aptly writes, “Animal characters are the raw material out of which 
children construct a sense of self,” (p. 150). Mimicry of animals and animal motion 
can be seen in children at the zoo. For example, Melson noticed children rocking 
back and forth with their toes turned out and elbows made to look like wings in 
front of the penguins at the New England Aquarium, and a boy who turned to roar 
at his startled sister in front of the lion cage at the Lincoln Park Zoo. For children, 
the emotions and personalities of animals, real and symbolic, are immediate in the 
same way that human emotions and personalities are (p. 19).  
In exploring why this connection with animals exists, evolutionary 
hypotheses are useful. E. O. Wilson’s (1984) Biophilia Hypothesis explains human’s 
natural interest and investment in life and life-like forces in evolutionary terms. 
Mutual dependence between animal species and humans has existed throughout 
evolution. Humans have been alert to the rhythms of animal and plant life around 
them to remain alert to safety and danger and the presence of food and shelter 
(Kahn & Kellert, 2002). This theory proposes that the presence of a calm and 
friendly animal became associated with safety and induced relaxation in humans.  
Humans had to be exquisitely attuned to the natural world for survival and this 
imprint still exists within our species, manifest in the fact that children typically 
become quiet and alert in the presence of animals.  Attunement to animals 
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throughout evolution led early humans to imagine themselves within the mind (and 
skin) of an animal (Melson, 2001). In his longitudinal research on the relationship 
between children and animals, Kellert (1997) found that through encounters with 
animals, children learn to know and understand others minds and think about how 
the mind is related to action. 
Animals and Theory of Mind. 
The ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and to understand 
that individual thoughts and minds may differ from one’s own is a developmental 
achievement. As discussed above, this cognitive ability has been identified as theory 
of mind. Researchers of theory of mind have typically studied our understanding of 
human minds. One noted difference between children and adults in the employment 
of theory of mind is that humans don’t typically attribute beliefs or intent to trees, 
cars, or most non-human animals. However, children readily do this (Siegler, 1998)  
Melson (2001) suggests that animals have certain qualities that may make 
them especially effective conveyors of theory of mind ideas (p. 93). Children can 
more easily connect mental states to behavior with animals because the pathway is 
often less convoluted and complex than in a human. Essentially, animal minds are 
“simpler to read.” Human relationships are complex and intricate, and young 
children may identify more readily with animals than adolescents or adults because 
of a fundamental emotional immaturity (p. 158). Even when making inaccurate 
conclusions about an animal’s state or anthropomorphizing, the child is gaining 
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practice in developing the capacity to mentalize. Animals are particularly useful 
objects of projection for children as they are represented as having one, and only 
one, feeling. The sly fox, the ferocious lion, are seen in an all or none way, and 
therefore children can relate to them in this singular, black and white way. The 
child can project his or her all or none fantasies onto a particular animal in useful 
ways. 
Animals not only help children make sense of the mind of another, but also 
may help them to express what is in their own mind. For example, a child might be 
able to express his shyness by acting like a turtle pulling its head and arms into its 
shell than by putting it into words.  Katcher and Wilkins (1998) found that children 
were able to reflect on their own minds using the animal as an intermediary. They 
noticed that children began thinking about their own feelings through conjecturing 
and reasoning about an animal’s feelings and relationships. By thinking about what 
the animal wants or needs, a child may be more able to express their own needs and 
desires. 
Learning from animals. 
Anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1966) wrote, “Animals are good to think.” Other 
anthropologists have observed the utility of animals as highly variable cultural 
symbols (Douglas, 1966; Evans-Pritchard, 1956; Leach, 1964). Wild animals have 
been used as a mirror against which humans have defined themselves for over 
60,000 years (Lévi-Strauss, 1963). The animal acts as a visible embodiment of 
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characteristics otherwise invisible in human beings. For example, Katcher (2002) 
explains, “cowardly and brave human beings may look alike in the supermarket, 
but lions and jackals always look different,” (p. 192). Observing animals can lead 
people to reflect on their own behavior as “animals are living demonstrations of 
diverse ways of eating, reproducing, communicating, and perceiving – some similar 
to, others different from, human behavior,” (Blue, 1986). 
Melson (2001) suggested that animals may function as a meaning making 
system through which children make sense both of themselves and their 
surrounding environments (p. 15). Children also use animal characters as visible 
manifestations of invisible human feelings and relationships (p. 151). Katcher 
(2002) made a similar point, noting that children learn new patterns of social 
behavior by first reasoning about real animals and then applying those insights to 
people.  Thus, in morality tales and fables the ambiguous world of grown-ups can be 
better understood when different types of behavior and affect are linked to different 
types of animals (Katcher & Wilkins, 1998). Unlike human characters, animals in 
fairy tales and children’s stories impart the essence of the issue without the value 
judgments associated with age, ethnicity, gender, etc. (Beck, 2011).  
As discussed above, animals are omnipresent in the lives of children. They 
appear in movies, stories, ads, video games, dreams, and thoughts. Animal 
attributes are useful for children because they are simple and speak to some part of 
the child that can be isolated and deeply felt. For example, the brave lion, the sly 
fox, the faithful dog, the busy bee, the beautiful butterfly, and the wise owl are all 
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animals that have been categorized and clearly represent facets of being with the 
advantage of avoiding conflicting or opposing emotions or attributes in one person. 
Stories in which small children save large animals may encourage the development 
of a child’s sense of mastery through a special bond to a large, usually wild animal. 
This could play out not only in story, but also in the real life messages conveyed 
about saving “charismatic mega-fauna” such as panda bears, elephants, and whales 
(Garland, 2008). 
Direct exposure to animals 
There are a number of factors that influence an individual’s relationship to 
animals. Prior experience is one of those factors. Meyers (1998) proposed that early 
experiences with animals are of the most predictive of the ways individuals care for 
animals as adults (2010). It has been found that life-long attitudes and behaviors 
towards animals are based in a large part on childhood experiences (Magnuson-
Martinson & Page, 1986; Kidd & Kidd, 1989). 
Kellert (1997) tried to determine whether proximity to wildlife impacted 
knowledge of animals. He found, in a study of 267 second- through eleventh-
graders, that widespread misperceptions persist through adolescence, but that 
proximity to wildlife assists in learning. Children living in the inner city had the 
lowest knowledge scores, while children in rural areas rated highest. He concluded 
that when children grow up around animals, they are likely to absorb more accurate 
knowledge about them. Serpell (1999) found that children who have direct 
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experience with living animals showed the highest ecological/moral/naturalistic 
attitudes and lowest avoidance/dominance/exploitative perspectives. Finger (1994) 
found that environmental behavior was most highly correlated to environmental 
experiences. His study further supports the idea that we care about what we know. 
Kahn (1999) studied the impact of culture on attitudes towards animals. He 
proposed that moralistic attitudes towards animals are not limited by culture or 
prior experience. He found that first-, third-, and fifth-grade African-American 
students from inner city Houston were equally sensitive to issues of animal-welfare 
as children their age living in the Amazon region of Brazil and in the Prince 
William Sound region of Alaska. 
Several researchers have suggested the importance of direct or personal 
interaction with animals as a catalyst for change in developing caring attitudes and 
behaviors (Meyers & Saunders, 2002). Dettman-Easler and Pease (1999) found that 
experiential programs resulted in significantly more positive attitudes towards 
wildlife than those with in-class education. Memorable life-events are often related 
to animal activity or proximity (Saunders et al., 2000). Arluke and Sanders (1996) 
wrote that sympathetic understanding is acquired through interacting directly with 
those who are studied (p. 43). In other words, it is our direct exposure to the animal 
that helps to develop concern and understanding. Is this because we begin to think 
about and better understand the experience of the other, in this case, the animal?  
31 
 
Direct exposure to animals, through observation, has incredible impact on 
children. The impact of animal observation is an underlying dynamic behind the 
present study. Observing animals in zoos and nature parks allows children to 
understand them as living beings. Watching animals provides the opportunity for 
experiences of self in relation to an other. However, Meyers and Saunders (2002) 
claimed that observing animals is not as immediate and potent for development of 
the self as interacting with them. Melson (2001) suggests that any involvement with 
animal life confronts a child with their morality and leads them to consider their 
own place as humans within the ecosystem, and biological knowledge and 
understanding may be accelerated through living in proximity to animals in the 
natural environment. 
Age and the human-animal relationship. 
Age is another important factor that influences one’s relationship to animals. 
Myers (1998) observed that as children develop, a strict division between human 
and animal attributes develops, which he calls “the categorically human self.” 
Researchers have identified at least nine distinct orientations towards animals: (1) 
Appreciation for the ecology of wild species and their habitats; (2) moral concern for 
proper treatment of animals; (3) “naturalistic” enjoyment of wildlife; (4) dislike, 
fear, or avoidance of animals; (5) need to dominate and control animals; and (6) 
interest in animals for their material benefit (Serpell, 1999). The first three 
increased with age, and the second three diminished with age.  
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Perceptions of animals seem to shift in consistent ways after the age of ten. 
Children under ten have been found to separate animals into dichotomous 
categories of “all good” or “all bad.” For example, Rost and Hartmann (1994) found 
that children under ten almost unanimously described wasps, crocodiles, wolves, 
rats, cockroaches, and spiders as “yucky,” “slimy,” and “scary.” On the other hand, 
the best-liked list was made up of dogs, cats, horses, rabbits, dolphins, panda bears, 
and chimpanzees. Cultural stories influence these “good” or “bad” conceptions. For 
example, lions are kings and crocodiles “tick tock” as a warning to those who might 
walk the plank.  
Particular ages have been marked as milestones in children’s impressions of 
animals. Piaget (1929) found that children go through a developmental stage in 
which they ascribe human traits to animals.  In a study of 102 children ages 3-10 
years, Kidd and Kidd (1996) found significant age differences in attitudes towards 
animals. Three to five year olds were most egocentric in their focus on animal 
appearance, behavior and what they enjoyed most about animals. Six to eight year-
olds began to demonstrated elements of empathy and perspective taking showing 
concern for animal endangerment, while nine to twelve year-olds clearly expressed 
empathy with their concern about helping, protecting, and caring for wildlife and 
opposition to killing animals as trophies. These stages applied to both attitudes 
towards familiar pets and wild animals (p. 124). Another study by Kellert and 
Westervelt (1983) found significant age differences in the attitudes of 250 children 
in both urban and rural environments. They found similar age related 
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developmental stages in the way that children relate to animals. Six to nine year-
olds showed increases in their affective relationship to the animals. Ten to thirteen 
year-olds showed an increase in cognitive understanding and knowledge of animals. 
Thirteen to sixteen year-olds showed an increase in ethical concern and ecological 
appreciation of animals. Myers (1998) observed that as children develop, a strict 
division between human and animal attributes develops, which he calls “the 
categorically human self.” As children develop, adults emphasize the treatment of 
animals as separate from themselves. 
As children are fed all sorts of contradictory messages about animals, they 
grapple with understanding the complicated mix of social codes regarding animals 
and their treatment. Isaacs (1930) writes, “There is probably no moral field in which 
the child sees so many puzzling inconsistencies.” For example, one animal can be 
raised to be eaten (cows) while others need to be protected but distanced from 
(bears) and yet others are kept as home as friends (dogs). Meyers (1998) found that 
instances of harm to animals were the most commonly reported event to parents by 
preschool children. When children harm animals, the behavior draws a lot of 
attention. Mead (1964) suggested that certain taboos regarding cruelty to animals 
are tempting to break for children. Melson (2001) hypothesized that children’s 
cruelty to animals may point to this complicated cultural mix of messages about 
animal treatment (p. 185).  
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Animal-Assisted Interventions. 
 A brief history. 
There has long been interest in the impact of animals on human well-being. 
The earliest documented system of spiritual belief, which is still in existence today, 
is animism. Animists believe that animals have spirits or souls, and can protect 
humans as “guardian spirits,” or cause illness or death when offended (Melson, 
2001, p. 106). In 1699, John Locke suggested that “dogs, squirrels, birds or any such 
things” should be given to children to look after to encourage the development of 
“tender” feelings and responsibility towards others (Serpell, 2011, p. 13, citing 
Locke, 1699/1964). In the 19th century, pets were common in mental institutions in 
England.  
In the 20th century, however, animals were essentially eliminated from 
hospital settings due to the advent of scientific medicine (Allderidge, 1991). Over 
the next 50 years, animals emerged in medical literature mostly in discussions of 
diseases transmitted from non-human animals, and in Freud’s (1959) discussion of 
animals as symbolic referents for the origins of mental illness. In much of 
psychoanalytic theory of this time animals were “flexible symbols taking myriad 
shapes to express a wide range of instinctual feelings and ideas” (Melson, 2001, p. 
149). 
Child analyst Boris Levinson is credited with the revival of using pets 
therapeutically. He introduced the idea that an animal, in this case his dog, Jingles, 
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could be used as a “co-therapist” in providing the child with a “relatively neutral 
medium through which to express unconscious emotional conflicts, worries, and 
fears” in the therapeutic environment (Levinson, 1962/1969). Levinson (1972) also 
discussed the role of an animal as a “social-lubricant,” in which a child with 
disturbed object relations could, through the relationship with the pet, re-learn to 
relate with people, or “return to the world of interpersonal relationships.” He wrote 
that the animal became the medium through which the child began to converse. It 
is important to note, however, that most documented incidences of the therapeutic 
use of pets have been with dogs, and not other animals.  
Animal-assisted therapy programs today. 
Therapists have been making use of animals in therapeutic settings through 
programs like Green Chimneys Children’s Services in New York and the Devereux 
Foundation in Pennsylvania. At both of these facilities, children who have 
emotional and or physical difficulties are treated through a number of modalities, 
one being the caretaking of animals. At Green Chimneys, animals are the modality 
through which much therapeutic communication occurs. Theoretically, the animal 
connection becomes a “stepping stone” to rebuilding ties to humans. Animals don’t 
judge, talk back, or represent potentially traumatic interpersonal early 
relationships as a therapist might. Many children confide in the animals and form 
strong attachments to particular animals (Mallon, 1992). D.W. Winnicott (1955) 
described the importance of “holding” as a place of absolute dependence in which 
the infant understands love as physical holding and protection. Later, it is in the 
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holding environment, when the infant is sure of being held, that the first moment of 
understanding himself as separate from the mother. Because this places the child in 
an extremely vulnerable position, to be separate, the child can only fully make this 
proclamation of self if he or she is sure of being held (Tuber, 2008). While first 
physical, this idea of the “holding environment” can also be emotional holding. In 
the milieu described above, the animals appear to serve as a holding environment 
for the children and adolescents living at the facility.  
Ross (1981, 1983, 1989) has written extensively about the therapeutic effects 
of the integration of children and animals at Green Chimneys. In one major study of 
these youth, Ross and his colleagues found that animals used in therapeutic and 
educational intervention influence participants to become involved and develop a 
rapport with therapists and can be the agent for therapeutic change (1984, p. 129). 
Psychologists at Green Chimneys have written about their understanding (and 
hope) that experiences with the texture of a sheep’s wool, curling up with a loving 
dog and other animal connections might begin to make up for a lack of “good-
enough” parenting experiences that many of these children have experienced. 
Observation of animal caretaking is another therapeutic aspect of the program. 
Ross described one child, previously closed to discussions of his early history, being 
moved or shaken by watching a rabbit take care of her babies, stating, “My mother 
never took care of me like that!”  This observation can encourage a child to think 
about or acknowledge their own depriving early experience and stimulate access to 
early memories as well. One further step that is taken at Green Chimneys is the 
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role of the child as caretaker. Children watch good parenting in the animal, and 
then take on the role as good-parent themselves. In this environment, even children 
who are closed to nurturing or caring feelings towards other people can be 
nurturing across species and explore this role with less conflict. For many of the 
children who have been abused, horses are a favorite animal, and riding a favorite 
activity. Melson (2001) hypothesized that the horse may symbolize something big 
and powerful that the child can control. The animals are potent symbols in many 
ways, mirroring a child’s experience. The healing of injured birds is an important 
part of the program, and not so subtly, part of the graduation ritual for children at 
Green Chimneys is to release a rehabilitated bird as a symbol of healing and 
freedom for both bird and child (Mallon, Ross, & Ross, 2000). 
The Companionable Zoo, developed by Animals-Assisted Therapy researcher 
Aaron Katcher (2002), is composed of over 100 animals including chinchillas, 
rabbits, guinea pigs, iguanas, turtles, finches, doves, goats, and Vietnamese pot-
bellied pigs. This “zoo” is located at The Devereux Foundation, a residential facility 
in Philadelphia for boys with severe conduct disorder and ADHD. In an experiment 
comparing the effects on behavior of the animal focused program and a non-animal 
focused wilderness program, Outward Bound, the Companionable Zoo (CZ) was 
more popular with the boys than Outward Bound (OB). CZ decreased aggression, 
which OB did not. CZ participants were significantly less aggressive in the 
classroom than OB boys. At the CZ, behaviors including nurturing, affection, play, 
lowered aggression, peer cooperation, accepting responsibility, teaching others, and 
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respecting adult authority were all observed. Focus and attention were improved in 
the presence of animals in the CZ such that learning could occur (Katcher, 2002). 
From this study, Katcher concluded that sustained contact with animals in the CZ 
was as effective as Ritalin (even outside of the zoo environment) in focusing 
attention in children with ADHD. Over the past decade, this model has expanded to 
work with children with severe developmental disorders such as autism, learning 
disabilities and emotion regulation difficulties (Melson, 2001). However, outcome 
studies of these types of treatments are still rare. 
While a wide variety of Animal-Assisted Interventions have been developed, 
few have been empirically tested. Several examples of these interventions will be 
discussed in this section. The first is an addition to psychodynamic play therapy 
that VanFleet (2009) introduced as Canine-Assisted Play Therapy (CAPT). CAPT 
uses a dog to facilitate attachment, empathy, self-regulation, problem-resolution, 
and self-efficacy. Next is an addition to Bibliotherapy, the guided reading of written 
materials in gaining understanding or solving problems relevant to a person’s 
therapeutic needs (Riordan and Wilson, 1989), in which animals are used as main 
characters to help children absorb difficult information (Burns, 2001). The use of 
stories in child therapy has been shown to be therapeutic (Bettelheim, 1977; Mills & 
Crowley, 1986). Reichart (1998) hypothesized that the child’s ability to identify with 
characters and themes is so powerful that the child will make unconscious 
connections to heroes and conflicts. Reichart used animals in her treatment of 
sexually abused children to connect with children about very difficult themes of 
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abuse. In the Animal Attribution Story-Telling Technique (Arad, 2004), family 
members assign an animal counterpart to each member of the family and then tell a 
short story about the animal protagonists. A similar technique, My Family as 
Animals, was designed by Rio (2001) to help facilitate the sustained attention of 
children in the family therapy room.  
Violent behavior continues to be a significant problem in many societies 
(World Health Organization, 2004). Programs that have had success at prevention 
of violence in children and adolescents have been aimed at the improvement of 
social, emotional, and cognitive skills of targeted at-risk groups (Beelmann et al., 
1994; Schneider & Byrne, 1985). There have recently been programs using animal-
assisted activities that have shown some success at the development of these skills 
and in violence prevention (Kruger and Serpell, 2006). Specifically animals are used 
because of their unique ability to appeal to children and adolescents (Arluke, 2004), 
to be highly responsive to participants and provide many opportunities for 
interaction (Myers & Saunders, 2002). 
Drugs are indispensible in treating psychosis and schizophrenia, but have 
been found to be less effective for socially relevant symptoms such as anhedonia, 
listlessness, or lack of empathy.  Many patients lose their interest in social 
interaction. The goal of animal-assisted interventions in this case is to rebuild 
interest in social contact (Prothmann & Fine, 2011). Beck, Seraydarian, & Hunter 
(1986) found, in a randomized trial, that for patients with acute and chronic 
psychotic disorders, the presence of a cage of finches made the hospital atmosphere 
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less frightening and alarming. They also found that in the therapy room, when 
animals were present, children participated significantly more in group therapy, 
and displayed social animosity significantly less than without animals present. 
In the presence of an animal. 
Recent research has shown that in the presence of an animal, significant, and 
potentially therapeutic, psychological, physiological, and social changes occur 
(Heimlich, 2001; Mansfel, 2002; Odendaal, 2000). In a Viennese elementary school, 
Kotrschal and Ortbauer (2003) found an association between the presence of a dog 
and a decrease in aggressiveness and hyperactivity. They also found an increase in 
social cohesiveness and attention paid to teacher, relative to a classroom with no 
animal present. Friedmann and colleagues (1983) found that the presence of a 
friendly animal reduced blood pressure and heart rate in children, which are both 
observable signs of anxiety. Allen and colleagues (1991) looked at the differences in 
stress level in the presence of a friend as compared to a pet. When asked to perform 
“stressful” tasks, adult females in the condition where a pet was present showed 
significantly less physiological reactivity than those with a human friend or no 
companion. It has also been found that anxiety is reduced in children who are asked 
to read aloud when there is a pet present (Friedmann, Thomas, & Eddy, 2000; 
Jalongo, Astorino, & Bomboy, 2004). Data suggests that conducting education in the 
presence of animals or natural settings is more likely to result in acceptance of the 
values of the educators and facilitate behavior change (Katcher, 2002). In a study of 
children with Down’s syndrome, Limond, Bradshaw, and Cormack (1997) found that 
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the presence of a real dog increased and sustained focus for positive and cooperative 
interactions with the dog as well as the adult participant relative to the presence of 
an imitation dog.  
In the presence of benign animals, highly aggressive children behave more 
cooperatively, become less antagonistic, and display greater social competence 
(Kaye, 1984; Ross et al., 1984; Katcher & Wilkins, 1993/2000). Katcher (2002) 
proposes a theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, which combines 
anthropologist Victor Turner’s idea of liminality (1982) with psychoanalyst D. W. 
Winnicott’s idea of the transitional object (1951). Turner (1982) developed the 
concept of liminality to describe a stage in transition or rite of passage. Liminality is 
the stage in which there is an intensification of the feeling of community or 
connection (“lateral bonds”) where authority is accepted, differences between 
participants are accepted and meaningfulness of and engagement in the task 
increases as distance from the role one is playing decreases. In liminality “people 
play with the elements of the familiar and defamiliarize them. Novelty emerges from 
unprecedented combinations of familiar elements,” (Turner, p. 26). Therefore, the 
presence of unfamiliar animals (novel stimuli) suggests a suspension of the rules of 
daily life that a child is used to and opens up space for change in ideas and behavior 
(Katcher, 2002). Winnicott (1971) described the transitional object as some thing or 
phenomenon that emerges out of an experience, is created by the child because of 
the feeling that it evokes in him or her, and represents that experience in a real 
enough way. The transitional object is the first form of transitional phenomenon. 
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Transitional phenomena exist in the overlap between inner and outer reality, and 
are simultaneously separate from both (Tuber, 2008). The child takes the attributes 
of a purely subjective experience and projects them on some real entity in the 
external world. An animal as transitional object, in this sense, cannot reject the 
attributes projected onto it, and can serve to be what a child imagines it to be. One 
objection to this theory however, is that the transitional object as Winnicott defines 
it, must be able to withstand mutilation, hating, and aggression. As this would be a 
problematic way for a child to treat an animal, a live animal might not serve fully 
as a transitional object in the sense that Winnicott described. Rosengrant (2002) 
takes this into account, criticizing a romanticized view of the child-animal 
relationship, and giving further weight to the idea of a child’s bond with an animal 
as similar to that of a transitional object for exactly the reason that the animal can 
be the object of both love and hate (p. 1326). Given this caveat, Katcher (2002) 
proposes that the presence of animals in the therapeutic space may create a leveling 
of the playing field, a space for new experiences to occur, and an object onto which 
the child can project feelings, desires and wishes that might not occur as readily in 
the human to human relationship. Melson and Fine (2006) hypothesized that 
animals play a special role in the therapy room as they have the ability to pass by 
the defenses and gain access to the unconscious. 
When in the presence of an animal, much more happens for a child than a 
simple cognitive distinction between animal and person. The experience of seeing 
an animal evokes an emotional reaction in a child. It is the emotional engagement 
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that fuels curiosity and fascination. This emotional response is a catalyst for 
learning in children (Melson, 2001). Part of what sustains the attention of a child is 
the changing state of an animal. “Animals are predictably unpredictable,” (Inagaki 
& Hatano, 1996). The cognitive incongruity and novelty of being confronted with a 
living thing, unique and reactive, is enough to trigger learning (Piaget, 1969). 
Novelty is a major factor impacting response to being in the presence of an animal, 
also employed in the present study. The animal is in many cases a novel stimulus 
and novel stimuli have been found to make more lasting impressions on children 
(Beck & Katcher, 1984). It is for this reason that researchers are recommended to 
test changes in response to animals over a period of time (Mallon, 1992). It must be 
remembered, however, that in all of the discussed interventions it is given that a 
fear of the animal or other negative response could occur and thus the interventions 
are not suitable in all cases. Overall, however, it has been found that the presence 
of animals in the therapeutic setting, either directly or indirectly through story or 
fantasy, may help open a dialogue or a therapeutic interaction. 
Animals and the development of empathy. 
Many theorists hypothesize that empathy development has its roots in early 
infancy and is dependent on the quality of early relationships (Eisenburg, 1992; 
Golemann, 1995; Winnicott 1960). Magid and McKelvy (1987) found that children 
with disturbed attachment styles might be more likely to lack empathy and abuse 
animals. Hastings and colleagues (2000) documented the relationship between 
empathy and lowered likelihood of violence towards others. However, empathy 
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towards people and empathy towards animals are not identical. That being said, the 
ways in which they are correlated suggest a significant overlap (Ascione, 2005).  In 
a sample of 514 adults, Paul (2000) found a significant, though small, correlation 
between measures of empathy towards people and empathy towards animals. It is 
worth noting that in the humane movement for the last 150 years it has been 
assumed that “children who are taught to respect animals will develop empathy, 
compassion, and grow up to be kinder to their fellow human animals,” (Arkow, 
1990/2010, p. 457). However, researchers are only just beginning to explore the 
human capacity for empathizing with other species (Wesbury & Neumann, 2008).  
Melson (2001) explores how encounters with animals affect developing 
capacities for empathy and sympathy and whether moral reasoning reaches across 
species lines. Contrasting Piagetian (1929) views of the development of empathy 
from a cognitive perspective with psychodynamic perspective of the development of 
empathic concern through “good-enough” parenting (Winnicott, 1960), she points 
out that these are both distinctly anthropomorphic perspectives on the development 
of this capacity (p. 96). Paul (2000) found that empathic concern was heavily 
experience based. Those participants who had pets currently or in childhood rated 
higher on the empathy towards animals scale than those who did not. Wood (2011) 
credited animals with contributing to the development of a range of life skills, 
including “empathy, learning to care and nurture, take on responsibility, and deal 
with grief and death,” (p.30). The capacity for cooperation, social trust and shared 
goals can be helped or hindered by the way in which people relate to others and are 
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able to see the world from another’s perspective (Wood, 2011). Anthropomorphic 
reasoning may be a key component of the development of these capacities in 
children (Katcher & Wilkins, 1998). 
Gee (2011) agreed with developmental theorists who state that empathy can 
be viewed as a learned behavior (Richardson & Norman, 2000), and for this reason 
its development can be facilitated. Several programs have been developed with the 
idea of using animals to facilitate affective development. In adults, prison inmates 
rescue abandoned horses and are trained to “gentle” them so they can be adopted, 
with the goal of developing empathy and reduction of recidivism in prisoners 
(Strimple, 2003; Fournier et al., 2007). For example, Soutar-Freeman’s (2003) 
program, in which children care for an animal, is aimed at teaching empathy, 
compassion, and respect for life. In a study of a similar, year-long intervention for 
first-, second-, fourth-, and fifth-graders, it was found that animal-related attitudes 
and animal-oriented empathy did generalize to human-directed empathy (Ascione, 
1992). 
Gender differences have been noted in empathic concern in children. In her 
study of empathy towards animals and humans, Paul (2000) found that females and 
younger participants showed significantly higher baseline levels of empathy in all 
conditions. Caring for an animal as a pet or otherwise can have particularly 
meaningful influence on a young boy, as caretaking and nurturing are still 
primarily seen as acceptable roles for women. Caring for pets however, is free of this 
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gender-role association and provides the opportunity for this developmental skill to 
grow in boys (Melson, 2001). 
Questions, controversy, and future research. 
There are many who question the validity of animal-assisted therapies and 
caution against their use in the absence of rigorous empirical studies.  There are 
other concerns as well.  Fraiburg (1967) cautions that in using a therapeutic 
animal, children may bond with the animal as a defense against expressing feelings 
towards humans. She suggests that the child may transfer affection away from 
humans onto animals. Similarly, Melson (2001) wonders whether children couldn’t 
form a pathological tie to an animal, substituting humans with animals. It is also 
possible that in animal assisted interventions, like any form of psychotherapy, the 
therapist is more effective due to his or her belief in the use of the animal (Frank & 
Frank, 1991). 
There is also a paucity of research in the field of human animal interactions 
and atypical child development (Melson, 2001). Arluke (2004) calls for research 
looking at the connection, if any, between children’s concern for animal well-being 
and prosocial behavior. Griffen and colleagues (2011) call for researchers to 
communicate across disciplines in order to further our understanding of Animal-
Assisted Interventions and the Human-Animal Relationship.  
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Why Elephants 
As the current study will examine the efficacy of an elephant-based 
intervention, this section will address the use of elephants, and their meaning as 
figures of identification or learning for children of different cultural backgrounds. In 
this intervention the mechanism at play is identification. Observing animals 
provides the opportunity for experiences of self in relation to an other.  In this 
study, development of the self will occur through observation and identification with 
the elephants. Therefore, it is crucial that elephants exhibit or represent the 
behaviors we are hoping to foster in children. 
 Animal emotions and anthropomorphism. 
Any kind of emotional attribution towards animals has been looked down on 
in the scientific community, and has thus made it difficult to study or learn about 
empathy in elephants and other species. “Science considers anthropomorphism 
toward animals a grave mistake, even a sin,” (Masson & McCarthy, 1995, p.32). 
Nevertheless, they suggest, there is a strong case to be made for the existence of 
emotions in animals, and to a great degree in elephants in particular. Observations 
of elephants both in captivity and in the wild have provided evidence for the 
capacity to feel a range of emotions including empathy, grief, and joy. 
Elephants and empathy. 
Few animal species are as likely to be described as empathic as elephants 
(Bates, et al., 2008). Like humans, African elephants live in coherent, coordinated 
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social groups, where individuals have both reason and opportunity to model the 
behavior, emotions, and mental states of others (Bates et al., 2008). Elephants are 
long-lived, slowly developing, large brained mammals that live in closely bonded 
societies (Bates, Poole and Byrne, 2008). Elephants are known for their close 
relationships (Bradshaw et al., 2005). It is typical of elephants to comfort and seek 
physical contact with calves every few minutes and protect and assist each other on 
a daily basis (Bates et al., 2008). 
Scientists have documented the existence of empathy in elephants. Elephant 
researcher Poole (1996) defined empathy as “the imaginative projection of one’s own 
consciousness onto that of another living entity,” p. 162. She observed evidence of 
this in African elephant populations in Kenya. She observed elephants, both kin 
and nonrelatives, coming to the aid of injured elephants. She hypothesized that 
these elephants have some capacity to know what it means for another to feel pain. 
Male elephants have been known to carry young branches to an old bull elephant 
who is too sick to forage for his own food (Masson & McCarthy, 1995). Elephants 
assist injured elephants both in the same family group and from other groups. 
Hamilton and colleagues (2006) found that elephants have a generalized response to 
suffering and death of other elephants that is not restricted only to kin.  
 It is well documented that elephants assist injured humans as well. Poole 
wrote of elephants watching guard over an injured person and chasing away 
animals that might do harm until someone came to rescue the injured. Poole writes 
that “I have no doubt that elephants have conscious thoughts and a sense of self,” p. 
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165. The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror has been linked to the capacity for 
empathy (Gallup, 1982). While the claim remains contentious, Plotnik, de Waal and 
Reiss (2006) found that elephants were able to pass mirror self-recognition tests.  
Another well known elephant researcher, Moss (1988), described African elephants 
expending substantial amounts of energy to avoid hurting a human, even when 
provoked. African herds will slow down to accommodate an injured member or even 
an adult female who is carrying a calf who has been dead for several days.  
Bates and colleagues (2008) carried out a longitudinal study in which they 
documented behaviors observed in African elephants that can be seen as 
components of empathy. These included forming coalitions, protecting, comforting, 
babysitting, retrieving lost individuals, assisting in mobility, and removing foreign 
objects. They found that elephants recognize characteristic aspects of normal 
elephant behavior and have expectations about outcomes of those behaviors. They 
are able to accurately recognize and respond to a range of emotions of other 
elephants, especially those to whom they are related. Elephants were observed 
showing what de Waal (2008) termed ‘sympathetic concern,’ where elephants 
offered protection and comfort to the calves of others or retrieved them from harm. 
De Waal described the “highest level of empathy as ‘empathic perspective taking,’ 
characterized by ‘targeted helping’ towards needy individuals. Bates and colleagues 
found that elephants exhibited this type of empathy in their assistance in 
overcoming mobility problems in calves. They also documented that elephants are 
very sensitive to the distress of others, and remarkably capable of anticipating and 
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preventing distress. Furthermore, as adult elephants sometimes help individuals 
who are not related to them, it was inferred that not all empathic behavior was 
linked to kinship and may represent a more generalized response to distress (p. 
223). 
The elephant’s demonstration of compassion across species is astonishing. In 
one example in Kenya, a rhino calf got stuck in the mud and an adult elephant 
worked for days to assist in lifting the rhino out every moment that the mother 
rhino, who didn’t seem to understand and charged the elephant every time she saw 
it approach, went to forage in the forest. The elephant clearly would gain no genetic 
benefit from helping the rhino, and elephants have not been known to confuse 
rhinos with their own species. Masson and McCarthy (1995) hypothesized that the 
elephant may have recognized the youth of the rhino and “felt a generous impulse to 
help,” p. 155. Of course, elephants are not always empathic or compassionate and 
can be quite aggressive towards other species. However, humans show a similar 
range of behavior and it does not discredit their capacity for altruistic behavior. 
Chadwick writes of his time spent in observing elephants that, 
If I learned anything from my time among the elephants, it is the extent to 
which we are kin. The warmth of their families makes me feel warm. Their 
capacity for delight gives me joy. Their ability to learn and understand things 
is a continuing revelation for me. If a person can’t see these qualities when 
looking at elephants, it is only because he or she doesn’t want to. (1992, 
p.432) 
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Grief and joy in elephants. 
Grief is another emotion seen in elephants. Researchers (Moss, 1988; Poole, 
1996) have found that elephants appear to have some concept of death. Elephants 
recognize and linger over one of their own species carcasses and skeletons. Moss 
observed one seven year-old calf who recognized and stayed with the jaw of his 
deceased mother turning it over and touching it with his feet and trunk. Elephants 
also bury the carcasses of their own by kicking up dirt and carefully placing 
branches on the carcass. Moss (1988) hypothesized that the lethargic behavior seen 
in females whose young claves have died who have shown no signs of illness before 
the calf died as akin to depression seen in humans (p. 271).  
Separation has been found to deeply impact elephants. Their attachment 
bonds are said to be especially strong due to the long gestation period (22 months). 
Zoo-keepers have described “sudden-death syndrome” or “broken-heart syndrome” 
when elephants (most often young) have died suddenly upon being separated from 
their social group or put into a new enclosure by themselves. Despite attempts to 
explain the behavior as rewetting of ducts in the eyes, it has been observed with 
near certainty that elephants weep. Darwin (1872) reported this finding in Indian 
elephants. It has been seen at zoos, circuses, and observations in the wild that 
elephants cry in situations where one would expect sadness, grief and remorse 
(Masson & McCarthy, 1995) 
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 Bradshaw and colleagues (2005) found that wild elephants display symptoms 
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder including abnormal startle response, depression, 
unpredictable social behavior and hyperagression, as a result of culling, poaching 
and habitat loss. Bradshaw and Schore (2007) demonstrated the effects of human 
imposed trauma on a range of elephant behaviors. They used abnormal behavior in 
wild elephants caused by disrupted attachment bonds to conclude that animals do 
in fact experience and express trauma on both a physiological and psychological 
level. 
Moss (1988) describes elephants as “intelligent, complex animals who may 
simply enjoy the social stimulation of a great gathering of relatives, friends, 
acquaintances and members of the opposite sex,” p.220. In her observation of 
reunion with other family members, Moss writes, “I have no doubt even in my most 
scientifically rigorous moments that the elephants are experiencing joy when they 
find each other again,” (p.116). 
Cultural assumptions about elephants.    
Melson (2001) writes, “…The sensitivity with which children can do this 
[understand animal minds and feelings] is basic to their humane regard for 
animals. Attunement to animal bodies and minds speaks to how well children can 
feel with and for animals and their environments” (p.94). However, attitudes 
towards animals are very much shaped by the culture in which a child is raised and 
can range drastically in their positive or negative valence. 
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Many species of wild animal are characterized by opposing attributes as some 
individuals see them as assets and others as pests (Tisdell & Xiang, 1998).  The 
same is true for elephants. Beliefs and attitudes towards elephants differ vastly 
among various groups. For example, Western views of elephants seen in zoos and 
picture books and those of Africans who live with wild elephants vary widely. The 
perspective of urban and rural inhabitant’s attitudes towards elephants in those in 
elephant-inhabited countries are significantly different as well. While there is a 
dearth of literature on this subject, it appears that, as might be expected, those who 
have most to lose from elephant conflict have most negative views towards 
elephants (Bandara & Tisdell, 2002). 
Conservation attitudes towards wildlife also differ because the creation of a 
national park is likely to have a much greater impact on those who have previously 
earned their livelihood from the natural resources of the land no longer allowed to 
be used by local populations. This phenomenon in which the alienation of key 
subsistence resources and ritual sites leads to clashes between local subsistence 
farmers, hunters and park officials and administration exists in much of Africa 
where land is conserved for elephants, including Burkina Faso (Garland, 2008).  In 
the U.S., elephants are one of the most popular and visited exhibits at zoos 
(Lehnhardt, 2005). The reconciliation of these varying cultural beliefs about 
elephants is a challenge, and will be taken into consideration in the present study. 
In conclusion, given the literature reviewed above, it was expected that 
elephants will be the ideal animal to foster empathy in children and that this 
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elephant-based intervention will lead to increased capacity to mentalize about 
elephants and development in empathic concern.  
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
Sample and Setting 
 Location. 
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) is a landlocked country in the West 
African Sahel that shares borders with six nations. It lies between the Sahara 
Desert and the Gulf of Guinea, south of the loop of the Niger River.  The land is 
green in the south, with forests and fruit trees, and desert in the north. Most of 
central Burkina Faso lies on a savanna plateau, 650–1,001 feet above sea level, with 
fields, brush, and scattered trees. Burkina Faso is a former French colony that 
received its independence on August 5, 1960. French is the official language. Dioula 
and Mooré are the most commonly spoken languages. Burkina Faso is a politically 
stable, but incredibly poor country with the majority of the population living on less 
than one U.S. dollar per day. Burkina’s poverty rate is estimated at 43.9 percent, 
and the country ranked 161th out of 169 countries in UNDP’s Human Development 
Index in 2010. The population is estimated at 17.7 million. Life expectancy is 53 
years and the literacy rate is 28.7%. (World Bank, 2010) 
The Children and Elephants program takes place in the Deux Balé national 
forest in Burkina Faso, West Africa. Southwest of the capital, the forest is adjacent 
to the town of Boromo. The Deux Balé Forest in Western Central Burkina Faso is 
the most well preserved wildlife reserve of the Mouhoun complex (See Figures 1&2 
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in Appendix A for maps of the study location). A population estimated at 300-350 
elephants resides in this forest. 
Culture. 
The Burkinabé, people from Burkina Faso, live in a collectivist society. A 
clear delineation has been made between collectivist and individualistic cultures. 
According to Hofstede’s (1991) definition, “individualism pertains to societies in 
which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after 
himself or herself and his or her immediate family.” Drechsler (1995) defined an 
individualistic culture as a modern Western and democratic society that places 
ultimate value on the individual person, which he sees as creating “an intrinsic and 
irresolvable tension between the individual and society.” Collectivism, on the other 
hand, “pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into 
strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect 
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 51). Hofstede also 
claimed that industrialized, wealthy, and urbanized societies tend to become 
individualistic, whereas traditional, poorer, and rural societies tend to remain 
collectivistic. 
In a collectivist culture like in Burkina, cooperation, empathic concern, and 
mentalization are crucial to keeping society running. However, in a country made 
up of immigrants, such as the U.S., individual achievement is paramount. 
Understanding how another person thinks and feels is something that an American 
may be able to get away without knowing. Though biased by the time and place in 
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which he wrote, French politician Alexis de Tocqueville, described this phenomenon 
stating, “In Europe we habitually regard a restless spirit, a moderate desire for 
wealth, and an extreme love of independence as great social dangers, but precisely 
these things assure a long and peaceful future in the American republics,” (1835). In 
American culture, individuality and concern for oneself over others are valued 
traits. These cultural differences may impact baseline levels of empathy. 
The Burkinabé are known for their film, music, and art. Despite the high 
poverty level in the country, there is a vibrant artistic community in Burkina Faso. 
Oral traditions of storytelling and performance are a major part of the culture. 
Human-Elephant Conflict. 
The program in Burkina Faso was implemented in order to mitigate the 
conflict between humans and elephants over land and resources. The pressures on 
this particular elephant population are tremendous. Habitat loss is by far the most 
important threat, as elephant poaching is very rare in Burkina-Faso.  Specifically, 
the habitat degradation and loss results from the following processes: (1) Illegal 
herding within the forest; cattle are the most numerous mammals of the forest and 
herders take their cattle to the forest, as the lands around the forest are entirely 
used for agriculture; (2) Agricultural fields are encroaching on the boundaries of the 
forest; fields have also been spotted inside the forest; (3) Illegal fishing and 
poaching of the remaining small sized game; (4) Illegal wood collection for firewood 
and woodcarving production; (5) Illegal fires are used to foster production of grazing 
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ground. Consequences of these pressures during the past century include: (a) The 
local extinction of all predators (lions, hyenas, leopards) that were present in the 
area less than 50 years ago; (b) The local extinction of buffalo and Buffon's koba; (c) 
The serious decrease in roan antelopes, redunca antelopes, patas (red monkeys), 
grivets, baboons and hippopotamus populations; (d) The probable (although not well 
documented) decrease of elephant populations. 
 The Mouhoun complex wildlife areas are under growing pressures, as West 
Africa is known to have the fastest growing human demography in all of Africa. It is 
very likely that the degradation process will increase if drastic changes do not occur. 
Under these conditions, the Mouhoun elephant population may become extinct by 
2050. 
The Des Elephants et Des Hommes educational program raises awareness 
about the degradation of the forest among the young generation and their teachers, 
which it is expected will raise awareness among parent of participating children 
and schools. The elephant is the flagship species, which needs the most habitat and 
area for its conservation. Therefore promotion of elephant conservation in turn 
promotes the protection of the forest. The benefits of conservation for the elephants, 
local biodiversity, and for the local inhabitants themselves include: (1) The forest, if 
sustainably used, can provide long term ecological services such as rain regulation 
in this region which borders the Sahel and currently faces the heavy consequences 
of climate change; (2) The forest can also provide river rims protection and 
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sustainable sources of wood and medicinal plants; and (3) Ecotourism, although 
limited, will also benefit the community. 
Perceptions of elephants in Burkina Faso vary considerably. As might be 
imagined, elephants are in competition for land with farmers in rural areas. 
Historically, elephants have been killed for meat or for ivory, although this is now 
illegal in the Deux Balé National Forest. Myths about elephants abound. Certain 
family groups hold the elephant and their totem, or spirit animal, and as such will 
not harm the elephant or even walk in its footprint. Some say that the elephant is 
large but unintelligent, and others hold that elephants are wise protectors of the 
forest. It is acknowledged that elephants can harm people and that it is not wise to 
cross an elephant. Some Burkinabé hold the belief that one should not look an 
elephant in the eye.  
Nature class and the Children and Elephants program. 
The organization running the interventions is called Des Elephants et Des 
Hommes (Elephants and People), an NGO that currently runs two programs 
focused on exposing local children to elephants in Africa. The first is the Elephant 
Outreach Program, which began in 2001 in the Okavango Delta in Botswana 
through the Living with Elephants Foundation. Enfants et Eléphants (Children and 
Elephants) des Deux Balé is the second site, which began in 2006 in the Boromo 
region of Burkina Faso. The current study will focus on the site in Burkina Faso.  
This program is described by the NGO as an extra-curricular elephant 
activity targeting children from 20 schools located around the forest in Burkina 
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Faso’s Deux-Balé forest region. In Burkina Faso, the program’s stated goal is to 
allow neighboring children to meet elephants in the wild and better understand 
their rich heritage with the future hope of mitigating the human-elephant conflict 
and leading towards the peaceful coexistence of people and elephants. It is also part 
of the philosophy of the organization that “the opportunity for the children to 
encounter elephants in this way is a captivating and unforgettable experience that 
will have a deep and lasting impact.” 
In the Deux-Balé forest region, the organization is working with 20 schools 
located around the forest. Each of the school has one CM1 level class (standard 6, 
4th grade equivalent in U.S.). Each class is made up of 30 to 110 pupils. All of these 
classes are offered the educational program. Depending on the number of pupils 
within the class, the organization takes 2 to 3 groups of pupils, each of which 
consists of 10 children and one teacher. For logistical and safety reasons it is not 
possible to take more than 10 children at one time. The selection of the pupils is the 
choice of the teacher. The organization asks to have 5 girls and 5 boys in each 
group. The program is run in close partnership with the local authorities including 
the Department of Education, the Department of Environment, as well as teachers 
and parents associations. Insurance covers the entire program. 
On the day of the nature class, students are collected from their school, along 
with an accompanying teacher, and brought to the Deux Balé National Forest in a 
program vehicle. Each group is taken to a safe place within the forest where 
elephants can be easily observed. The main objective of the excursion is to expose 
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the children to their natural heritage (the elephants and surrounding forest). The 
educational program consists of a set of educational games and wildlife observation 
sessions. Educational games teach the children about the fauna and flora of their 
forest, the positive and negative uses of the forest, the benefits of ecotourism, and 
what makes up the ecological network of life and the role of elephants, elephant 
behavior. During and after the observation of elephants, the participants have 
unlimited opportunity to ask questions and discuss what they saw. 
After the program in the bush, the educational team goes to the classroom to 
teach the students who did not participate in the excursion. This is the indirect 
exposure group. This intervention is organized around the My Elephant Neighbor 
book. The booklet included a culturally appropriate educational story about the 
human-elephant conflict, as well as a section about elephants in the surrounding 
region, with several color photos of local elephants. Children in this group were 
given the opportunity to read and discuss the book.  The indirect exposure condition 
was developed because it is not possible for all students to participate in the nature 
excursion.  
In 2011, 50 groups, including 500 children and their teachers participated in 
the intervention program and approximately 1000 additional pupils were educated 
in their classroom.  I began my collaboration with Enfants et Eléphants in 2005.  I 
have lived in West Africa and am fluent in French, the national language of the 
participating country. The organization, Enfants et Eléphants, has given their full 
support of the proposed research study. 
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Subjects. 
The sample was made up of 106 students in the CM1 level class (4th-5th grade 
equivalent, typically 10 to 11 year old students). Six different schools were used out 
of the 21 participating in the My Elephant Neighbor Program in the Deux-Balé 
forest region (see Figure 3 in Appendix A for map of the region). Two participating 
schools were from rural villages, Koho (n=18) and Ourobonon (n=17); and four 
schools were within Boromo, Boromo “A” (n=17), “B” (n=18), “C” (n=18), and “D” 
(n=18).  
As shown in Figure 1, participants ranged in age from 9-15 years. One 
student out of the 106 did not know her age. The average age of the sample was 
11.1 years with a standard deviation of 1.1. There were 56 females and 50 males 
who participated in the study. As shown in Figure 2, maternal and paternal 
ethnicities were distributed across 18 different cultural groups. For both parents, 
the majority of the sample was Mossi, the principal ethnic group of Burkina Faso, 
which makes up about 40 percent of the population. 
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Figure 1: Age distribution of sample.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency Distribution of Ethnicity by Parent.  
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The sample was split into four groups. This year, because of improved park 
management and more space for the herds to safely inhabit, the consistency of 
elephant sightings on the Nature Class excursions was decreased. This led to the 
creation of a fourth group, nature class no observed elephants group (NOE), those 
who went to the park, participated in the nature class, but had no direct exposure to 
elephants.  
The observed elephants group (n=39), or direct exposure group, was made up 
of those who participated in the nature class in the reserve and did get to observe 
the elephants. The in-class education group (n=26), or indirect exposure group, was 
made up of those who were given in classroom education through the My Elephant 
Neighbor book. The book included a culturally appropriate educational story about 
the human-elephant conflict, as well as a section about elephants in the 
surrounding region, with several color photos of local elephants. This was the first 
year that the My Elephant Neighbor booklet was implemented and as such both the 
booklet and its classroom implementation will be improved based on this year’s 
findings. The control group (n=22) was made up of students in the same class who 
did not participate in either intervention. Finally, the NOE group (n=19), as 
mentioned previously, was made up of those students who participated in the 
nature class in the Deux Balé reserve, which included educational games and 
activities, but did not have the opportunity to see elephants (no direct exposure). 
Almost all participants, 97 percent of the sample, were in the top 25 percent 
of their respective classes. Three percent of the sample ranked between the 25th and 
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40th percentile. All interviews were conducted in French, the subjects’ second or 
third language. A local colleague accompanied the researcher to assist in 
translation. Participants were interviewed at their school one to two days before the 
intervention, and again immediately following the intervention.  
Procedures 
 For each participating class, the teacher was informed of the research ahead 
of time and asked whether or not they were willing to participate. When consent 
was granted, the teacher attained written consent from the parents, and on the day 
before the nature class, or several days before, the researcher and translator went 
to the school and asked for assent from study participants.  
 For the pretest, the researcher met with each participating class in a private 
area of the school for one hour. Participants were each given one piece of blank 
paper and one sharpened pencil. The participants were then asked to draw a person 
and an elephant. Next the researcher asked all pretest questions while the 
translator assisted in making sure that there was good comprehension from each 
participant. Participants were given the pretest measures orally, as reading levels 
varied across subjects. Response time to questions was not limited. The measures 
were given to all groups on the same day.  
The indirect group participants were given the educational booklet separately 
from the other students and told not to share the book with any other classmates 
until the following evening. The following afternoon or several days following, after 
participation in the nature class, all study participants, including the control group 
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were given the posttest. The procedure for posttest data collection was identical to 
the pretest procedures, except that demographic data was not gathered in the 
posttest. It was again emphasized that participation was entirely voluntary and 
neither they nor their student should feel any pressure at all to take part in the 
study.  
This procedure was carried out at all six participating classrooms.  All 
identifying information was removed from the data in order to assure subject 
confidentiality. Data was entered by the researcher into an excel file while in 
Burkina Faso in order to make sure that study data was not lost.  
Measures. 
  Pre- and post- test measures used were identical save for a demographic 
form gathering identifying information and a consent and assent form that was 
used at baseline and not at follow up.  The measures included the demographic 
questionnaire; open-ended questions which asked about prior experience with 
elephants, elephant knowledge, perceptions of and attitudes towards elephants; a 
modified version of the Children’s Environmental Attitude and Knowledge Scale 
(CHEAKS; Leeming, O’Dwyer & Bracken, 1995); a modified version of the Basic 
Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006); a modified version of the 
Mentalizing Stories for Adolescents (MSA; Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009); and a pencil 
and paper drawing of a person and an elephant. 
Demographic form: A simple form describing basic demographic information 
(including name, age, gender, race/ethnicity of both mother and father, school, 
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ability to identify an elephant, and previous exposure to elephants). This 
information was gathered verbally by the researcher. 
Consent forms: Written informed consent was obtained from the parent of every 
participating student and written informed assent was obtained from every 
individual participating in the study. The form was reviewed with each participant 
– and, if he or she was voluntarily willing to participate, signed – before the 
interview took place. Examples of the different kinds of measures were given at this 
time. The interviews and assessments took place in a private area located at the 
school of the participant. 
Open-ended questions: The open-ended questions were included in order to assess 
participant’s attitudes about elephants without any sort of suggestion. As there 
have been no previous studies of children’s attitudes towards elephants in Burkina 
Faso, an open-ended model was useful in order to hear the participants own words, 
and gather as much original data as possible. 
CHEAKS: In order to measure change in attitudes and behaviors a modified version 
of the Children’s Environmental Attitude and Knowledge Scale (CHEAKS; 
Leeming, O’Dwyer & Bracken, 1995) adapted to address elephant knowledge and 
conservation issues was used. The CHEAKS is a valid self-report measure of 
commitment to environmental causes measured across four domains: verbal 
commitment, actual commitment, affect, and knowledge. It is made up of 36 
questions using a 5-point likert-type scale ranging from very true to very false that 
measure environmental attitudes, feelings and behavior, as well as 30 knowledge 
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questions with 5 multiple choice answers. The modified CHEAKS used in this study 
was adjusted for linguistic difficulty, cultural differences and the availability of 
time. The questions were also modified to focus more on elephants than the original 
measure.  It was made up of ten questions rated on a Likert-type scale from 0-2, 
total scores from 0-18.  
BES: The Basic Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006) is valid 
multidimensional measure of empathy. The self-report measure consists of 40 items 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly 
agree) with eight items reverse-scored. All responses are summed for a total score; 
high scores reflect high empathy, with 9 items measuring cognitive empathy and 11 
measuring affective empathy. In Burkina Faso, a shortened version of the French 
language counterpart adapted and validated for use with French speaking 
population was used (D’Ambrosio et al., 2009). 
MSA: The Mentalizing Stories for Adolescents (MSA; Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009) is a 
written, self-administered, scenario-based inventory that asks the participant to 
read twenty vignettes or stories in which the main character interacts with another 
person. The MSA stories are not entirely imaginative or highly fictional, but 
describe relevant everyday situations. In each story, a negative interaction takes 
place between the protagonist and another person, who is usually the protagonist’s 
friend, classmate, sibling, or parent. This interaction elicits feelings such as 
sadness, anger, disappointment, jealousy, or shame to the protagonist, who does or 
says something as a result of this negative state. After reading each vignette, 
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respondents are asked to answer briefly, in a few sentences, why the central 
character behaved in the story as he or she did. For example, one story stem reads: 
“Helen enters her bedroom and there she catches her younger brother holding her 
mobile phone and reading her text messages. Once Helen’s brother notices her, he 
immediately apologizes and begs her to forgive him but Helen is staring at him 
without saying a word.” The question asked is: “Why does Helen do that?” There are 
three possible justifications given which are rated on two dimensions: whether they 
involved explicit and accurate identification of the emotional state of the 
protagonist, and whether they involved explicit and accurate identification of the 
intentional state of the protagonist. The range of possible total scores for the twenty 
MSA items is zero to forty. A modified Mentalizing Stories for Adolescents (MSA; 
Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009) was used that employed culturally appropriate narratives 
to assess children’s capacity to mentalize in both elephant and human related 
scenarios. This modified version of the MSA was also administered verbally, while 
the participant held a paper copy, in order to account for the varied reading levels of 
participants. Images of each scenario were given to assist in comprehension.  
Drawings: Children were asked to draw a person and an elephant before and after 
the intervention in order to address potential difficulties in verbal expression given 
the language barrier. Several researchers have argued for the use of drawings in 
research with children. For example, Alerby (2000) carried out a study of children’s 
drawings of the environment and concluded, “A drawing can tell us something.” 
Vygotsky (1971) argued that thinking is closely connected to art and thus, art 
70 
 
constitutes an advanced way of thinking. Much has been written on the diagnostic 
utility of children’s drawings. Arneheim (1969) wrote that visual arts are a sort of 
visual thinking. Several researchers have used empirical material consisting of 
drawings (Alerby, 1996; Aronsson & Andersson, 1996; Palmberg & Kuru, 1998; 
Wenestam & Wass, 1987). Maureen Cox (1992) wrote about how children can have 
local art traditions and geographically located artistic conventions. These issues will 
be explored in the qualitative analysis of pre-post drawings in this sample. 
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
The proposed study assessed participants of the Children and Elephants 
education program in Boromo, Burkina Faso. Participants were assessed at baseline 
(before the intervention) and immediately after participating. The proposed study 
compared four groups: The observed elephants group, those who participated in the 
nature class in the reserve and did get to observe the elephants; The in-class 
education group, those who were given in classroom education through the My 
Elephant Neighbor book; the nature class no observed elephants group (NOE), those 
who went to the park, participated in the nature class, but had no direct exposure to 
elephants; and the control group, students in the same class who did not participate 
in either intervention.  
The proposed study aims to investigate the affective development (specifically 
development of empathy and mentalization) that takes place following this 
conservation-focused intervention that brings children to meet and learn about 
elephants and elephant behavior. This study will evaluate the efficacy of the 
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intervention on changing children’s attitude both towards conservation and their 
capacity for empathy towards elephants and humans. The following are this study’s 
hypotheses:  
1) It was hypothesized that changes in attitudes, knowledge, feelings, and 
beliefs about elephants as measured on the modified Children’s Environmental 
Attitude and Knowledge Scale (CHEAKS; Leeming, O’Dwyer & Bracken, 1995) will 
be greater in all three intervention groups than in the control group, and further, 
that changes on the CHEAKS in the observed elephants group will be greater than 
in the in-class education group and the NOE group.  
2) It was hypothesized that changes in mentalization as measured by 
responses to culturally appropriate narratives on the modified Mentalizing Stories 
for Adolescents (MSA; Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009) will be greater in all three 
intervention groups than in the control group, and further, that changes on the 
MSA in the observed elephants group will be greater than in the in-class education 
group and the NOE group. 
3) It was hypothesized that changes in empathy as measured by the modified 
Basic Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006) will be greater in all three 
intervention groups than in the control group, and further, that changes on the BES 
in the observed elephants group will be greater than in the in-class education group 
and the NOE group. 
Participants’ pre- and post- test drawings as well as open-ended qualitative 
questions will also be analyzed in order to ascertain changes in attitudes, emotions 
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and knowledge that may occur over the course of the study. It was also proposed as 
an exploratory hypothesis that qualitative changes will be seen in the observed 
elephants group. Specifically, increased caring and empathic attitudes and 
knowledge towards elephants, and shift in the direction towards greater thinking 
about the experience of the elephant and understanding of the self and other in this 
relationship, or metalizing, is expected. Differences in participants’ responses by 
gender and age will be examined as well. 
In the long term, this research will allow us to learn more about the impact of 
elephant interventions on children’s affective development. Finding ways in which 
children’s interactions with the natural environment are beneficial may in turn 
promote conservation and lead to further exploration of animal-based interventions. 
Data Analysis Plan 
All data was entered into SPSS Statistics 17.0. The data was analyzed using 
a between groups analysis of variance looking at participant’s change scores across 
a number of quantitative measures. Change scores from baseline to posttest were 
compared. Qualitative measures, including drawings and open-ended questions 
were analyzed looking for themes and changes by group. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Baseline Descriptive Data 
Ninety percent of the sample (95/106 participants) reported never having 
seen an elephant in person on the pretest. Ninety nine percent of the sample 
(105/106 participants) were able to name an elephant when shown its picture 
during the pretest. Nearly half of the sample thought that there was a risk of 
elephants disappearing from the region; 64 percent reported that there were 
elephants in the region; and 82 percent reported that they like elephants. Baseline 
data are presented in Table 1, which shows the frequency of responses to questions 
regarding basic elephant experiences and attitudes at baseline. 
In examining differences in attitudes and knowledge based on age, gender, 
ethnicity and region, a significant difference was found on the response to the 
question “Do you like elephants?” Of the 17 participants who reported that they did 
not like elephants, 100 percent were from rural villages as opposed to one of the 
schools in the town of Boromo. This does not appear to be correlated with whether 
or not a child had seen an elephant previously, as only three out of the eleven who 
had seen an elephant previously were from rural villages, and the other eight lived 
in Boromo. 
There were no significant differences between males and females on their 
attitudes towards elephants, nor was there a significant difference based on age of 
participants on the pretest.  
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As shown in Table 1, the majority of participants expressed feelings of pride, 
protection, and care towards elephants on the pretest; however, most also did not 
report conservation behaviors or knowledge about elephant conservation. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Modified Children’s Environmental Attitudes and Knowledge Scale Responses at 
Baseline 
 
Question Yes/ 
Correct 
No/ 
Incorrect 
I 
Don’t 
Know 
When you grow up will you 
keep your cattle near the 
village to leave the forest for 
the elephants? 
53 49 4 
I am proud to live in a region 
where there are elephants. 
87 19 0 
I planted a tree. 67 39 0 
I have asked my parents how to 
protect animals. 
40 66 0 
I am afraid of elephants 78 28 0 
I am angry when people hunt 
elephants for their meat or 
ivory. 
89 15 2 
I will be sad if elephants 
disappear from the region. 
73 33 0 
Elephants take care of their 
families. 
92 11 3 
Among the elephants, who is 
the leader of the group? 
(Matriarch) 
4 99 3 
What do elephants need to live? 
(Looking for at least food, 
water, space) 
37 68 1 
What will happen if there are 
no more elephants? (Looking 
for ecologically minded 
response) 
70 36 0 
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Quantitative Findings: Change Scores 
 Hypothesis 1: Changes in attitudes, knowledge, feelings and beliefs 
about elephants. 
Change scores on the CHEAKS were found by calculating difference scores 
(Posttest– Pretest scores) for each participant and then averaging the change scores 
for each group. Average change scores by group are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
 
Average Children’s Environmental Attitudes and Knowledge Scale (CHEAKS) 
Change Scores by Group 
 
Group AVG Change Score on CHEAKS 
Observed Elephants 2.667 
In Class Education 2.22E-16 
Control .955 
Nature Class, NOE .579 
 
Using a one-way Analysis of Variance to measure change in performance on 
the CHEAKS, a significant difference was found between groups at the 0.05 alpha 
level, F(3,102)=3.69, p=0.014 (see Table 3). Subsequently, pairwise comparisons 
were carried out. The direct exposure group had significantly higher change scores 
than all three other groups, p<0.1 (see Table 4). The direct exposure group improved 
significantly more than the indirect group on the CHEAKS at the 0.01 alpha level, 
p=0.003 (see Table 4). 
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Table 3 
 
Between Subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for Change Scores on the CHEAKS 
 
Source SS Df MS F Sig 
Group 129.257 3 43.086 3.686 0.014 
Error 1192.253 102 11.689   
Total 1496.000 106    
 
Table 4 
 
Pairwise Comparisons of CHEAKS Change Scores using Least Significant Difference 
 (I) Group (J) Group Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error 
Significan
ce 
Control Elephants 
Observed 
-1.712* .912 .063 
In Class .955 .990 .337 
NOE .376 1.071 .726 
Elephants 
Observed 
Control 1.712* .912 .063 
In Class 2.667* .866 .003 
NOE 2.088* .957 .031 
In Class Control -.955 .990 .337 
Elephants 
Observed 
-2.667* .866 .003 
NOE -.579 1.032 .576 
NOE Control -.376 1.071 .726 
Elephants 
Observed 
-2.088* .957 .031 
In Class .579 1.032 .576 
 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.10 alpha level. Not sure what this 
means?  
 
It was also found that whether the participant lived in a rural village or a 
town had a significant impact on their attitudes, knowledge, feelings, and behavior 
toward elephants. On the CHEAKS, the participants from the town of Boromo 
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scored significantly higher than those participants from rural villages both on the 
pretest t(104)=3.691. p<0.05, and on the posttest, t(104)=2.997, p<0.05. On the 
pretest the average CHEAKS score from village participants was 8.8 and from town 
of Boromo participants the average score was 11.18. On the posttest the average 
CHEAKS score from village participants was 10.25 and from town of Boromo 
participants the average score was 12.38. Despite this difference in village and town 
respondents, there was no significant interaction between the participants’ village 
status and group, F(2,98)=.763, p=0.469. Therefore being in the direct exposure 
group led to stronger change scores in both village and town participants.  While not 
a significant difference, the in-class education through the booklet showed more 
impact in villages than in the town, while the control remained stable in the village, 
but showed some improvement on the CHEAKS in the town. Figure 3 presents the 
CHEAKS change scores by group and participant locale. 
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Figure 3: Average change score on CHEAKS by locale (village or town) and by group 
 
Responses to the question, are you proud to live in a region where there are 
elephants, increased in “yes” responses significantly more both in the observed 
elephant group and the in-class education group than in the NOE group and the 
control group, with change scores significantly higher in the observed elephant 
group than in the in-class education group, p<0.01. 
Fear of elephants decreased significantly more in those participants who 
went on the nature class (both the observed elephant group and the NOE group), 
regardless of whether or not they saw elephants, when compared to the in-class 
education group and the control, p<0.05. 
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Hypothesis 2: Changes in mentalization. 
Significant age differences were found at baseline on responses the 
Mentalizing Stories Test about elephants. It was found that participants ages 9 and 
10 were more likely to identify with elephants and understand their feelings and 
behaviors than those ages 11-15, as shown by significant age differences found on 
the modified Mentalizing Stories Test for elephants with greater scores in children 
10 and under, t(99)=-2.066, p<0.05.  
Change scores on the Mentalizing Stories Test were found by calculating 
difference scores (Posttest– Pretest scores) for each participant and then averaging 
the change scores for each group. Average change scores by group are shown in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
 
Average change scores on the modified Mentalizing Stories Test by group 
 
Group Mean Change MSA 
People 
Mean Change MSA 
Elephants 
Elephants Observed 0.27 -0.237 
In Class -3.47E-17 -0.125 
NOE -0.263 0.526 
Control -0.1 -0.091 
 
 
Using a one-way Analysis of Variance to measure change in performance on 
the MSA, no significant difference was found between groups for the Mentalizing 
Stories Test about people, F(3, 97)=.791, p>0.05, or for the Mentalizing Stories Test 
about elephants, F(3, 99)=1.128, p>0.05. 
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Hypothesis 3: Changes in empathy. 
Change scores on the BES were found by calculating difference scores 
(Posttest– Pretest) for each participant and averaging the change scores for each 
group. Average change scores by group are shown in Table 6. 
Between groups comparison of change scores on the modified Basic Empathy 
Scale showed no significant differences at the 0.05 alpha level, F(3,101)=.256, 
p>0.05 (See table 9). However, as shown in Table 6, the only group with a positive 
direction of change was the elephants observed group. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Mean Change score on modified BES by group 
 
 
 
 
A baseline gender difference in empathy on the question, “Do you feel sad 
when you see someone crying?” was also found. As shown in Table 7, 91.1% of 
females responded “yes” compared to 74% of males. A chi square comparison found 
this to be a significant gender difference, χ2 (2)=7.053, p<0.05. 
 
 
Group Average Change 
Elephants Observed 0.103 
In Class -0.080 
NOE -0.211 
Control -0.182 
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Table 7 
 
Frequency table: “Do you feel sad when you see someone crying?” by gender 
 
Gender Sometimes Never Always Total 
Total Females 
Percent of females 
0 
0% 
5 
8.9% 
51 
91.1% 
56 
100% 
Total Males 
Percent of males 
4 
8% 
9 
18% 
37 
74% 
50 
100% 
Total 
Percent of total 
4 
3.8% 
14 
13.2% 
88 
83% 
106 
100% 
 
 
Qualitative Findings: Open-ended Questions and Drawings 
Participants were asked open-ended questions in order to ascertain their 
perceptions about the human-elephant conflict, the role of elephants, and the needs, 
behaviors and qualities of elephants as well as to draw an elephant and person. The 
following section will present selected qualitative findings. 
Draw a person and an elephant. 
Themes emerged in the pre and post drawings of a person and an elephant in 
the observed elephant group that were distinct from the other three groups. 
Significantly, in the posttest only, there was more interaction such as touching, 
communicating, and waving, between the elephant and the person than in the other 
groups. Figures 4 and 5 show a pre- and post- test example from an 11-year-old 
female in the observed elephants group. In the pretest drawing the person is the 
focus of the drawing and much larger than the elephant. The person looks angry 
and the elephant appears to be running away. In the posttest drawing the boy is 
82 
 
excited to see this large creature, and stands waving at the elephant who is 
peacefully drinking at the watering hole. 
Another theme that was found in the observed elephants group posttest 
drawings was people drawn with similar features or body movements as the 
elephant in the drawing. This theme occurred in the observed elephants group only 
and could potentially be evidence of identification with the elephant on the part of 
the participant. There was a clear difference between pretest drawings that did not 
show this similarity and posttest drawing where the similar features were 
apparent. Figure 6, a posttest drawing from a 10-year-old boy in the observed 
elephants group, is presented here as an example of the body posturing and 
apparent motion of the person mimicking that of the elephant. Figures 7 and 8 show 
a pre and a posttest drawing by a 10-year-old girl in the observed elephants group 
in which this theme was apparent as seen by the similar nose on the person and 
elephant in Figure 8, while in Figure 7 there is no resemblance.  
Notably, on all post tests in the elephant observed group there were no 
elephants drawn in captive situations, on leashes, or working, unlike the other 
three groups. Figures 9 and 10 show a pre and posttest from a girl in the no 
observed elephants (NOE) group. The elephant in the posttest is on a leash. The 
drawings seen in Figures 11 and 12 are from two different female participants on 
the posttest. Figure 11 is a drawing by a girl in the in-class education group where 
she wrote, “She is working/driving the elephant.” Figure 12 was drawn by a girl 
from the observed elephants group where she wrote, “She’s looking at the elephant.” 
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Figure 4: Pretest drawing by subject #3, an 11 year-old female from Boromo in the 
observed elephants group. 
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Figure 5: Posttest drawing by subject #3, an 11 year-old female in the observed 
elephants group. Above elephant: “An elephant drinking the water.” Child says: 
“Oh, a large elephant.” 
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Figure 6: A posttest from subject #32: a 10-year-old boy from Boromo in the 
Observed elephants group 
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Figure 7: Pretest from subject #82: a 10-year-old girl from Ourobonon in the 
observed elephants group 
 
Figure 8: Posttest from subject #82 a 10-year-old girl from Ourobonon in the 
observed elephants group 
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Figure 9: Pretest drawing by subject #37, a 10 year-old female in the no elephants 
observed group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Posttest drawing by subject #37, a 10 year-old female in the NOE group. 
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Figure 11: Posttest drawing by subject #69, an 11 year-old female from Koho in the 
in-class education group, “Elle conduit l’elephant.” [She is working/driving the 
elephant] 
 
 
Figure 12: Posttest drawing by subject #55, a 15 year-old female from Koho in the 
observed elephants group, “Elle regarde l’elephant.”[She is looking at the elephant] 
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Open-Ended Questions. 
When asked to describe an elephant on the posttest, participants in the 
observed elephant group and the in-class education group were more likely to use 
words with positive or negative valence, rather than neutral descriptors.  
The Role of Elephants. 
In the observed elephants group, a 12 year-old male from Boromo reported on 
the pretest that, “the role of elephants is that people kill them.” Following his 
participation in the program, he reported that the role of elephants is “to live.” The 
number of participants describing the role of elephants as crucial to the ecosystem 
because they plant trees through the seeds that they excrete, creating forests, went 
from zero on the pretest to eleven on the posttest. All eleven participants were from 
the observed elephant group. One 10 year-old female from the village of Koho in the 
observed elephant group said on the pretest that the role of elephants was “to 
destroy trees,” and following the intervention she described their role as “to destroy 
and to plant,” showing a more integrated perspective. A belief of one 13 year-old 
male in the observed elephants group from the village of Ourobonon was that the 
role of elephants is “to live with the white people who help the elephants.” In the 
posttest he reported that the role of the elephants was to guard the forest. Again in 
the observed elephant group, one 10 year-old female from the village of Ourobonon 
reported on the pretest that “the elephants are there to help us [humans],” and on 
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the posttest stated that the role of the elephants is “to have fun with each other.” 
In the NOE group, one 10 year-old male from Boromo first believed that 
elephants encourage the lions to devour the other animals. Notably, after the 
nature class where he was not able to see elephants, he reported that the role of 
elephants is to encourage the lions not to eat the other animals. 
Human-Elephant Conflict. 
In the in-class education group, after reading the story about the elephants, 
the message that elephants have been killed by people seemed to be better 
understood than in other groups. The majority of these participants in the posttest 
reported that the biggest danger to elephants was that people might shoot them, 
either for ivory or meat, or conflict over land.  
One 14-year-old female from the village of Ourobonon in the in-class 
education group said on the pretest that the biggest conflict between humans and 
elephants is that elephants cause problems. After reading the booklet she stated 
that the biggest problem between humans and elephants is that people kill 
elephants. One 13-year-old female from the village of Ourobonon in the observed 
elephants group reported that the biggest problem between people and elephants 
was that she was afraid of elephants on the pretest. After the intervention, she 
reported that the biggest conflict is that people like to kill elephants.  An 11-year-
old female also from Ourobonon in the observed elephants group showed a change 
in her understanding of the reciprocal nature of the human-elephant conflict. She 
originally stated that the biggest problem between people and elephants is that if 
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an elephant is around it will kill her. After the intervention, she reported both sides 
of the problem; that people kill elephants and reciprocally elephants harm people. 
In the posttest, the observed elephant group was the only group where the 
belief that there are no problems existing between humans and elephants was not 
reported. All other groups showed an increase in the response “no conflict,” from the 
pre to the posttest. Table 8 presents frequencies of both the no conflict response and 
the reciprocal or two-way response by group. In a post hoc analysis, significant 
between group differences were found, χ2(3) =15, p<0.05, see Table 9. 
 
Table 8 
Frequency of no conflict and reciprocal conflict responses to the question, “What is 
the biggest conflict between elephants and humans,” by group. 
 
Group No Human-
Elephant 
Conflict 
Pretest 
No Human-
Elephant 
Conflict 
Posttest 
Reciprocal
/two-way 
conflict 
Pretest 
Reciprocal
/two-way 
conflict 
Posttest 
Observed 
Elephants 
0 0 1 4 
No 
Observed 
Elephants 
0 6 0 0 
In-
Classroom 
0 2 0 0 
Control 1 4 0 0 
 
Table 9 
Chi-square results for responses to human-elephant conflict question  
 Value df Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
15.000 3 .002 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
Overview 
It was hypothesized that (1) changes in attitudes, knowledge, feelings, and 
beliefs about elephants as measured on the modified Children’s Environmental 
Attitude and Knowledge Scale (CHEAKS; Leeming, O’Dwyer & Bracken, 1995) 
would be greater in all three intervention groups than in the control group, and 
further, that changes on the CHEAKS in the observed elephants group would be 
greater than in the in-class education group and the NOE group; (2) changes in 
mentalization as measured by responses to culturally appropriate narratives on the 
modified Mentalizing Stories for Adolescents (MSA; Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009) would 
be greater in all three intervention groups than in the control group, and further, 
that changes on the CHEAKS in the observed elephants group would be greater 
than in the in-class education group and the NOE group; (3) changes in empathy as 
measured by the modified Basic Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006) 
would be greater in all three intervention groups than in the control group, and 
further, that changes on the CHEAKS in the observed elephants group would be 
greater than in the in-class education group and the NOE group. The results 
supported hypothesis one but not hypotheses two and three. Conclusions drawn 
from these central findings, as well as conclusions drawn from other aspects of the 
data will be discussed in the following chapter. Study limitations and 
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recommendations for future research will also be addressed in this section. 
Attitudes, Knowledge, Feelings, and Beliefs about Elephants 
It was hypothesized that direct exposure to elephants would lead to the 
greatest increase in environmental attitudes and knowledge specifically related to 
conservation of elephants, more so than any other type of intervention. A significant 
difference was found between the group of participants who observed elephants 
themselves and those who learned through a teacher, a book, or had no education at 
all. The first group showed more positive change than the other groups. These 
results supported this hypothesis. The findings suggest that it is one’s personal 
experience that leads to an internal shift and ultimately the development of a 
conservation ethic, more so than being taught about elephants from a third party. 
This finding supports the literature on the importance of personal 
experiences in shifting attitudes. Researchers have found that direct experiences 
with animals have the most impact when it comes to caring attitudes and behaviors 
(Serpell, 1999; Meyers, 1998; Kidd & Kidd, 1989; Kellert, 1997; Finger, 1994). Here 
again, with this Burkinabé sample, the children who were able to see and know the 
elephant were most likely to change their attitudes towards caring and sympathy 
for and conservation of the elephants. 
Seeing this internal shift in a Burkinabé sample is particularly salient given 
the historical context of colonialism in West Africa and the need for elephant 
conservation to be relevant to those most affected by it for this cause to be 
sustainable. The local interest in elephants as neighbors that was observed in this 
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study is critical to sustainable conservation. Past research has found that moralistic 
attitudes towards animals are not limited by culture (Kahn, 1999). The results from 
the present study support this claim. In the qualitative findings, the 13 year-old 
male in the observed elephants group whose understanding of the role of elephants 
shifted from, “to live with the white people who help the elephants,” to “guard the 
forest,” was a particularly salient example of this shift. Here, after observing 
elephants in their natural environment, this participant went from understanding 
Westerners as those interested in protecting and taking care of elephants, to taking 
ownership of thinking about the elephant and its role as guardian of the forest. 
Ultimately the decision for species protection comes down to the community. The 
local interest in and internal desire to protect their local elephant populations will 
be crucial to sustainable protection of elephants. 
Significant differences were found between participants from rural villages as 
compared to those from the town of Boromo on attitudes towards elephants. This 
difference, in which participants in villages had more negative attitudes and beliefs 
about elephants overall than those from the town, was not correlated with whether 
or not a participant had seen an elephant before. Therefore, it is likely that those 
participants who live in rural villages have been educated about the dangers of 
elephants as they pose a greater threat to this group. Village populations in this 
region are mostly agricultural and as elephants destroy crops, they are more likely 
to be negatively impacted by them. Elephants are also more likely to enter a village 
and potentially cause damage than to go near the town. Therefore elephants pose a 
95 
 
greater threat to the participants and their families in the rural villages. It is very 
poignant then that the participants from the rural village were just as likely to 
change their attitudes as those from the town, showing a sustained effect of the 
direct observation of elephants across both town and village participants. This 
finding supports the claim that the impact of personal experiences with elephants 
and the opportunity to safely observe them is enough to create a shift in attitudes. 
But that leaves open the question of why this happens.  
What is occurring during that observation, and on what level does that 
internal shift take place? Examining themes found in the drawings of a person and 
an elephant suggests several possibilities. Participants who observed elephants 
were engaging with the elephant on a personal level, as seen by the greater number 
of drawings showing interaction between the person and the elephant such as 
touching, communicating, and waving, between the elephant and the person in 
posttest drawings from the observed elephants group than in the other groups. Also 
in the observed elephants group, on the posttest, several drawings showed a person 
and an elephant with similar features, and similar body position or movement, 
which may be another sign of the identification occurring from the participant to 
the elephant. The participants appear to be humanizing the elephants. While this is 
a first step in understanding what happens for the child when they meet the 
elephant, these questions will be explored further in the following section on 
mentalization. 
Finally, while not a significant difference, the booklet had more of an impact 
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in the villages than in the town. This may have been due to the lack of resources 
such as books or television that could have exposed children to elephants in the 
villages. The novelty of the elephant book may have made it more impactful in the 
rural village than in the town. The control group however showed some increases on 
the CHEAKS in the town while remaining stable in the village. Access to resources 
may have caused the book to have less impact in the town. A small increase in 
scores on the modified CHEAKS was found in the control group in the town but not 
in the rural villages. This may have been because participants in the control group 
may have had access to resources such as books, media, and community members 
that could teach them about elephants and create some small amount of change in 
the town control group. 
Mentalization 
It was hypothesized that mentalizing capacity would increase over the course 
of the interventions. Specifically, it was expected that this shift would first happen 
through the elephant by way of the direct message of the program, and then 
generalize to people. While there was no significant difference found between 
groups on the modified Mentalizing Stories Test, qualitative differences were found 
in the open-ended questions. 
A clear developmental shift was seen at an earlier and more basic stage of 
mentalization, understanding the subjectivity of the other, and in this case, the 
elephant. Before one can accurately attribute thoughts and feelings to an other, one 
must know that the other has it’s own mind and feeling states (Fonagy et al., 2002; 
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Sharp, 2006). Understanding that the other has a mind, thoughts, feelings of it’s 
own is therefore a fundamental step in developing the capacity to mentalize. 
Changes at this earlier stage of mentalizing were observed, wherein the 
participants of this program began to think about and hold in mind the subjectivity 
of the elephant. The modified mentalizing stories test was designed to measure 
accurate attribution of thoughts feelings and mental states, and was not able to 
measure changes in inter-subjectivity. Therefore the measure used to assess 
mentalization through stories and attributing thoughts and feelings accurately may 
be a later stage of development that is not yet developed through this program, and 
a different measure may be more useful in capturing this developmental 
achievement.  
As discussed earlier, the term mentalization refers to “the capacity to 
envision mental states in the self or other, to use an understanding of mental states 
- intentions, feelings, thoughts, desires, and beliefs – to make sense of, and even 
more importantly, to anticipate, another's (or her own) actions” (Slade, 2009, p.8). 
As reflected in Slade’s definition, this capacity involves several stages. Before one 
can accurately attribute thoughts and feelings to an other, one must know that the 
other has it’s own mind and feeling states (Slade, 2009). Understanding that the 
other has a mind, thoughts, feelings of it’s own is a fundamental step in developing 
the capacity to mentalize. Therefore, in the development of mentalization, the child 
must begin to hold the other in mind and imagine that they have thoughts, feelings, 
and needs of their own. Posttest responses showed that participants were keeping 
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the elephant in mind. 
Changes at this earlier and critical stage of mentalizing were observed, 
wherein the participants of this program began to think about the subjectivity of 
the elephant. Changes in the qualitative responses to open ended questions showed 
that participants in the program began to think about the elephant as having its 
own needs, thoughts, and feelings. As participants began to describe the elephant’s 
motivation: living in family groups to take care of their young and needing the 
forest for food and for space and water they showed a newly formed understanding 
up the elephant as a subjective other with it’s own mind and it’s own self and needs. 
Again, the qualitative findings about the role of the elephants, several 
participants showed on the posttest that they were thinking about the role of the 
elephant from the elephant’s perspective. For example, one student first believed 
that elephants encourage the lions to devour the other animals, and afterwards 
reported that the role of elephants is to encourage the lions not to eat the other 
animals, clearly showing that the elephant has a mind to think about encouraging a 
lion to behave in a certain way. Another participant first reported that “the 
elephants are there to help us [humans],” and post-intervention stated the role of 
the elephant is “to have fun with each other.” 
 Notably, when asked about the human-elephant conflict, participants in the 
observed elephants group who were unable to think of ways that elephants and 
people might conflict on the pretest were able to think about the elephant’s 
experience and how that interacts with humans on the posttest. The responses of an 
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11-year-old female from a rural village in the observed elephants group are an 
example of the types of changes towards mentalization that were observed in all 
three intervention groups. She showed a change in her understanding in thinking 
about the elephant’s experience. She originally stated that the biggest problem 
between people and elephants is that if an elephant is around it will kill her. After 
the intervention, she reported both sides of the problem; that people kill elephants 
and reciprocally elephants harm people. The main distinguishing feature of the 
observed elephants group on this question and on mentalizing capacity was their 
understanding of the reciprocal nature of the human-elephant conflict. The fact that 
all participants who had direct exposure to elephants were able to show some 
understanding of the potential conflicts between humans and elephants as opposed 
to all of the other groups, shows that there was some trigger of or shift towards 
thinking about the elephant and the human experience of cohabitating in the world. 
In sum, participants did come to think about the elephants as separate and having 
their own subjective experience, a critical development that was not measured by 
the modified Mentalizing Stories Test. 
Age implications for effective intervention. 
A major finding in this study that points to the need for early intervention 
was the age difference found on the modified Mentalizing Stories Test for elephants. 
Children who were 9 and 10 years old were significantly more likely to identify with 
the elephant than those age 11 and older. This was measured by the participant’s 
attribution of human characteristics to elephant behavior in a multiple-choice 
100 
 
scenario. While this is only a preliminary finding, it does support the claim that 
developmentally, children are more likely to identify with animals at an earlier age 
(Melson, 2001). It is likely that identification is most likely to happen at the time 
when children are naturally prone to identify with animals and animal attributes.  
It was hypothesized that this shift in the capacity to mentalize occurs first 
through the animal and then generalizes to humans. For this to happen with 
animals, the child needs to be open to this identification as well as interested in the 
animal’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Because of the developmental shift that 
takes place after the age of ten away from the animal, and towards identification 
with humans, this type of animal-focused intervention might be most effective at 
around age 10 and younger. This finding suggests the need for early intervention 
when it comes to environmental education regarding elephants.  
The Role of the Elephant as a Subject of Observation 
Why was the elephant effective as a subject for study in this intervention? As 
stated above, this study examined the efficacy of an elephant-based intervention, in 
which one of the mechanisms at play was identification. It was believed that 
observing animals provides an experience of self in relation to an other, and in this 
study, the elephant was the subject of observation and, hopefully, identification. It 
was crucial that elephants exhibited or represented the behaviors that this 
intervention was hoping to foster in children. In the observed elephants group, this 
was the case. 
Children had the opportunity to observe elephants taking care of their young 
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in many ways. This included adults forming a circle around the babies to protect 
their young, adults bathing and washing their young, and even a matriarch turning 
to display her size when she felt that the young elephants might be in danger. The 
elephants were almost always in family groups and frequently played with or gently 
touched each other with their trunks. Another altruistic behavior that was 
exhibited in front of the children was the elephants lending a helping trunk when 
another was stuck in a muddy area or had difficulty getting out of the watering 
hole. Given these behaviors, it is possible that the elephant as a particularly social 
and empathetic species had an impact on shifting the children’s attitudes towards 
them through observation and identification. 
Empathy 
While it was hypothesized that changes in empathy would be seen on the 
modified Basic Empathy Scale, there were no significant changes. The only trend 
that was noted was a slight positive shift in the observed elephants group, but as 
this is not a significant difference, no conclusions can be drawn about changes in 
empathic capacity that occurred over the course of the interventions. However, 
qualitative changes were seen in participants’ likelihood to try to empathize with 
the elephants, gaining insight into their thoughts and feelings (Decety and Jackson, 
2004). Participants reported that elephants live in family groups in order “to take 
care of each other,” that elephants can be sad if a family member dies, and that 
other species, including humans, may be sad if there are no more elephants in the 
region. This kind of thinking about the feelings of others, both human and elephant, 
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involves empathy.  
Although, attempts to measure changes in empathic capacity were 
unsuccessful, this finding makes sense in retrospect, as emotional or affective 
changes may not occur over the course of one week. The qualitative and directional 
changes noted in the findings may be signs of ways in which this intervention 
plants seeds of empathy in part of a longer growing process towards healthy 
emotional development. 
A baseline gender difference was found in empathy. A significantly higher 
percentage of females than males reported feeling sad in response to another’s 
sadness. This gender difference in childhood expression of empathy supports the 
literature that girls express empathy earlier than boys (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; 
Martin & Clark, 1982). 
Study Limitations and Future Research 
This study had several limitations including the design of the measures, 
access to participants, length of study, and cultural factors that may have 
influenced the results. There are several reasons that no significant differences on 
the modified Mentalizing Stories Test and modified Basic Empathy Scale were 
detected. The length of the modified questionnaires was too short. The full-length 
questionnaires were almost four times as long as the modified measures used in 
this study. The measures had to be shortened due to factors on the ground including 
restricted time with participants and unfamiliarity with and discomfort on the part 
of the teachers with very long interviews. Given more time with participants, a 
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wider variety and more questions would have been used. The types of questions 
asked, including a Likert-type rating scale were not commonly used among this 
sample of children, and it is possible that not all of the children understood the 
questioning style, which may have impacted participants’ ability to accurately 
respond.  
The modified Mentalizing Stories Test, the assessment designed to measure 
accuracy of mentalizing was not able to measure changes in inter-subjectivity. 
Therefore the measure used to assess mentalization through stories and attributing 
thoughts and feelings accurately may in fact be assessing a later stage of 
development, and one that is not developed through this program. A different 
measure may be more useful in capturing the child’s nascent understanding of the 
other’s subjectivity. 
The next major factor was the potential influence of a Caucasian American 
researcher. The rural West African participants were unaccustomed to being in the 
presence of a Westerner and it is likely that ideas about the researcher may have 
had some effect on participant behavior and responses. The influence of the 
researcher’s presentation should be considered in understanding the findings, but 
the control group should have helped to mediate this effect as well as the fact that 
the same researcher and local colleague interviewed all 106 participants. 
The short period of time between pre- and post- assessments was another 
limitation of the study. While the impact of the intervention was examined, long-
term changes were not assessed. A longitudinal one-year follow-up with this same 
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cohort has been planned, but this is outside the scope of the current dissertation.  
Another limitation of the study was a difference between the in-class 
education booklet and the nature class. The nature class intervention has been in 
existence in the region for five years while this was the first year that the booklet 
was being used in classrooms. The booklet may not have been as well implemented 
as the nature class as teachers were not able to supplement the book’s instruction. 
The booklet may have been more effective than was found in this study if used in 
conjunction with teacher intervention or other in class lessons. Therefore, the 
impact of the in-class education program should be re-assessed after it has been 
revised and re-implemented. However, the impact of the direct elephant observation 
still stands as the comparison between the nature class with no observed elephants 
group and the nature class with elephants observed group allowed for an 
alternative assessment of the impact of direct exposure to elephants. 
Given the findings from the present study, future research should be carried 
out to further explore the psychological impact of animal-based intervention 
programs. First, future research should look at the long-term effects of this program 
as the cohort has already been measured before and after the intervention. As these 
are initial findings further study should continue to explore the ways in which 
gender, age, and culture influence perceptions of elephants and the efficacy of both 
field-based and classroom-based environmental education programs. In the 
following year, it is hoped that the same participants will be evaluated and changes 
in both conservation attitudes and empathic capacity will be measured one year 
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post intervention. As differences between those from villages and the town’s 
perception of the role that elephants play were significant, future research should 
also consider the context of the participants carefully and target areas most in need. 
It would also be interesting to study the impact of a similar intervention on children 
from a vastly different culture to more clearly understand the impact of cultural 
beliefs and attitudes on this elephant-based intervention. 
Over the past ten years, Des Elephants et Des Hommes educational program 
has found that a majority of the local children living near elephant reserves where 
the NGO is active have never been exposed to elephants. This was again found in 
Burkina Faso in 2011. This means that almost all of the children who participated 
in this program were seeing elephants for the first time. The effect of novelty should 
be measured in future studies by comparing those participants who are seeing 
elephants for the first time to those who have previous exposure to elephants. The 
number of participants with previous experiences with elephants was too small to 
be measured in this sample. 
Conclusions 
Preliminary conclusions can be drawn that environmental education 
programs in which children have direct experiences with elephants may be most 
effective in communicating conservation messages and in developing a sense of the 
elephant as a separate being with its own subjectivity. This may be due to the 
personal meaning created through experience, as opposed to an idea or lesson, and 
the identification that occurs with the exposure to an elephant. Other interventions 
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such as indirect exposure through games and classroom activities also lead to some 
improvement in conservation attitudes. It is also believed that the connection that 
children have with animals, as seen in the younger child’s identification with the 
elephants, creates an ideal time to intervene, specifically with environmental 
education programs directed towards the protection and understanding of local 
elephant populations. These types of interventions may be useful not only in 
fostering a conservation ethic, but also in building the capacity to think about 
others and critical psychological capacities that have been implicated in resilience 
and healthy emotional development. The duration of these effects remains to be 
studied in this same sample. 
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